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ABSTRACT 
Optimal spatial pricing for electricity and its impact on renewable and 
embedded generation 
This PhD investigates the importance of implementing adequate locational 
signals and their possible effects on generation technologies and the performance and 
regulation of the electricity system, with particular reference to renewable energy in 
the British electricity market.  
For over twenty years economists have known how to calculate the optimal 
spatial pricing for electricity, known as nodal or locational marginal pricing. 
However, such knowledge appears to have been ignored by the designers of most 
electricity markets, with the key exception of a few US and international markets. 
Furthermore it has been suggested that there may be a conflict between the 
implementation of adequate locational signals and the development of renewable 
energy because the former may lead to higher network charges which may 
compromise the profitability (and therefore the feasibility) of renewable energy 
plants. The literature appears to have already addressed several of the key issues 
considered by this PhD: spot pricing, optimal spatial pricing, renewable policies, 
network investments, integration of renewable energy into the power grid. However 
there seems to be a theoretical and empirical gap in terms of combining these issues 
together: e.g. given the adoption of optimal spatial pricing, how does this affect the 
level of production from renewable energy (wind in particular)? Thus this thesis 
investigates how different forms of spatial pricing may affect renewable 
technologies, with regards to both their investment and operating decisions, and what 
regulatory or other policy implications this might imply. In particular this PhD 
focuses on the British case, where it is alleged that the introduction of more efficient 
spatial pricing might compromise the development of generation technologies 
located in particular areas, especially on-shore wind farms in the north of the 
country. The research contributes to an important area of current policy debate, given 
the strong targets for growth in renewable as part of climate change policy and 
growing concern about energy security. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HOW THIS IS ADDRESSED 
Since the agreement of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 there has been a growing 
realisation that fast and effective measures are needed to stop the dangerous impact 
of man-made climate change. Decarbonisation of our power supply is a key part of 
this solution; however, there is growing concern amongst policymakers across the 
developed world that electricity markets are not providing sufficient incentives to 
stimulate “adequate” investment in new low carbon generating capacity. There is a 
concern that investment is not coming at the right time, in the right locations or using 
the right technologies to meet our environmental objectives (Joskow, 2006). Indeed 
EASAC (2009) has recently argued that most European electricity systems are 
already struggling to build a certain amount (adequate investment) of renewable 
energy (using the right technologies) by 2020 (at the right time), where there is 
enough supply of renewable sources and network capability (in the right place). The 
same issue has been addressed with more details in several technical reports, such 
Ernst & Young Renewable Energy Group (2009) or ETSO (2007).  
The implementation of locational price signals1 has an impact on the whole 
electricity chain: e.g. where and if a particular producer invests, will depend, among 
other things, on the level of network charges he must pay. Clearly this also includes 
renewable generation technologies. Therefore it appears appropriate to try and gain a 
better understanding of how spatial pricing may affect investments in different 
generation technologies and their operations. In particular this PhD aims at 
investigating the following research question(s):  
Can the objectives of a locationally efficient network policy and those of a 
renewable policy be achieved simultaneously? And what are the trade-offs of 
achieving both policies simultaneously? 
                                                 
1
 Locational signals may be defined as economic incentives that are given to market players to reflect 
their geographical situation, in order to influence trading decisions – short-term effect – and invest-
ments – long-term effect –. 
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Such research question has been mainly addressed by means of quantitative 
tools. In particular, an ad hoc welfare optimization model has been developed, in the 
context of a binding renewable target, with particular reference to the British electric-
ity market. Great Britain represents an ideal business case to analyse due to, besides 
the availability of data, the ongoing debate on the interactions between network is-
sues and the deployment of more sustainable generation technologies: e.g. the current 
consultation on locational charges for balancing services (Ofgem, 2009a).   
1.2. RELEVANCE AND NOVELTY OF THE RESEARCH 
1.2.1. Relevance 
As far as the relevance of this PhD is concerned, it has to be said that 
economists claim to have known for more than twenty years how to calculate the 
optimal locational price2 of electricity, i.e. adopting the nodal pricing approach 
(Green, 2007). And yet, in spite of this, this knowledge seems to have been mostly 
ignored since nodal pricing has been implemented in few electricity systems, 
specifically Chile, New Zealand and some US markets (and a few others like 
California are following suit).  
Moreover the situation in Europe proves that designing and implementing 
efficient spatial pricing in liberalized electricity markets has proven very difficult, as 
shown by the fact that while the time dimension has been addressed in similar ways 
(e.g. real-time market, with 1 to 3 hours from gate closure) across different systems, 
locational signals have been adopted following a wide range of methodologies (see 
Table 1). Also, most systems seem to have adopted a different solution for 
organizing the transmission business (e.g. various kinds of unbundling, Independent 
System Operator, etc.). 
Indeed it may be argued that research into more efficient forms of spatial 
pricing is becoming increasingly relevant due to a series of recent developments, 
such as: 
• Distributed generation is becoming very popular as a way of making electric-
ity systems more sustainable; however, this technology mostly is not eco-
                                                 
2
 Nodal pricing and locational marginal pricing (or LMP) are all synonyms of optimal spatial pricing. 
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nomically compensated for the positive externalities it creates on networks 
(e.g. reduced load and losses). 
• Several European countries are experiencing a “dash for renewables”, mostly 
on-shore wind; however, the lack of adequate locational signals may lead to 
larger imbalances in the grid and, more generally, much greater network 
costs. 
• The first generation of off-shore renewables, wind in particular, are coming 
on-line in Europe (e.g. UK); however this is a brand new area from an 
economic perspective (e.g. how to regulate their transmission lines), which 
has just started to be investigated.  
• The increasing planning difficulties (e.g. local opposition) faced by 
developers of new energy infrastructures - either power plants or transmission 
lines - means that often the latter are put on hold; however such a “market 
failure” may be reduced if the right forms of locational signals were put into 
place. 
• The European Union is still trying to complete the liberalization and 
integration of its national electricity markets; however this process is bound 
to be weakened until more efficient and harmonized pricing arrangements are 
adopted in key problems like congestion management, third-party access and 
cross-border trade. 
This “spatial problem” is a common feature of all restructured power markets 
and the UK seems to represent a very suitable example, especially with regards to the 
interactions between network policy and renewable policy. Indeed the latter is 
currently debating an optimal solution for charging distributed generators - from 
deep to shallow connection charges -, for regulating off-shore wind farms and for 
charging transmission-connected on-shore wind farms in the North of the country. 
Furthermore in a recent report on sustainability the British energy regulator argues 
that significant transmission investment will be required to relieve capacity 
constraints on the system that are delaying new renewable technologies from coming 
to the market (Ofgem, 2009c). Clearly any network policy in the Great Britain must 
be assessed against the background of a country which is far from achieving its 
current 2010 Renewable Obligation (RO) target of 10.4%, let alone a more 
challenging one for 2020, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Table 1 Different methods of transmission pricing across Europe(ETSO, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimal spatial pricing for electricity and its impact on renewable generation technologies and 
their operations  
 16 
 
Figure 1 Renewable electricity generation in the UK (Ofgem, 2009c) 
 
 
1.2.2. Novelty 
With regards to the novelty of this PhD, as chapter 2 will explain in detail, 
there are plenty of scientific articles that address nodal pricing and even more that 
discuss renewable technologies. Overall, however, there seems to be a lack of 
economic analysis into the interactions between different generation technologies 
and different forms of locational signals. More importantly, it appears that the spatial 
issues of renewable energy technologies are often overlooked, probably because the 
former are not considered relevant when compared to the greater aim of achieving a 
renewable target and making electricity systems more environmentally sustainable. 
This PhD intends to address such gap. 
Also, there seems to be little analysis into the reasons why locational marginal 
pricing, in spite of being supported by most economists, has been adopted only by a 
minority of power systems worldwide. The combination of theory (the optimization 
model) and practice (actual data on the British electricity system), used in this thesis, 
allows provision of further insights on this particular topic: e.g. moving from a less 
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efficient electricity pricing to a nodal one represents a non-zero sum game, which 
creates politically sensitive regional gains and losses. 
From a methodological point of view, it should be noted that compared to a 
recent study (Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen, 2008), which addressed both 
nodal pricing and renewables in the German market, this PhD treats wind energy as a 
free choice variable subject to capacity constraints rather than as a fixed input. This 
approach provides a more accurate representation of wind as an intermittent and 
variable resource. Finally, compared to other similar studies on locational signals in 
Great Britain, like Green (2007), this research looks at a future scenario, i.e. 2015, 
when wind is due to play an increasingly more crucial role in the generation mix. 
Furthermore this PhD adopts a completely different network approach (radial rather 
than meshed) from previous studies.  
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1. Research Questions 
Can the objectives of a locationally efficient network policy and those of a 
renewable policy be achieved simultaneously? And what are the trade-offs of 
achieving both policies simultaneously? 
1.3.2. Research Sub-questions 
From this starting point a number of research sub-questions can be broken 
down and addressed in turn. These are: 
• Given the adoption of optimal spatial pricing, how does this affect the level 
of production from renewable energy (wind in particular)? 
•  What happens to the social welfare of an electricity system, which has 
adopted optimal spatial pricing, when there is an environmental target (e.g. 
renewable penetration or carbon emissions) to be met? 
• How can we develop a more sophisticated approach to renewable policy 
which takes into account these trade-offs? 
1.3.3. Aim 
The overarching aim is to address the research question defined above. It must 
be pointed out that network costs have represented so far only a relatively small per-
centage of a typical utility bill, as shown in Figure 2. However, according to IEA 
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(2008) at least 50% of $26.3 trillion worth of investments required by electricity sys-
tems worldwide will be in transmission and distribution infrastructure (see Figure 3). 
Therefore it seems rather appropriate to use the above mentioned research question 
as a means to investigate how deploying low carbon technologies may affect network 
costs and developments in restructured electricity system such as the British one. 
 
Figure 2 Breakdown of a typical household energy bill in the UK (Ofgem, 2009d) 
 
 
Figure 3 Cumulative investment in energy infrastructure in the reference scenario, 2007-2030 
(IEA, 2008) 
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A more general aim of the research is to join the debate on the design and regu-
lation of restructured electricity markets through the analysis of the effects of differ-
ent forms of spatial pricing upon generation technologies (not only renewables) and 
their operations. 
1.3.4. Objectives 
In order to answer the research questions, the following specific objectives are 
pursued:  
• Understand through a literature review how spatial pricing works in all its 
different forms: e.g. nodal prices, zonal transmission tariffs, etc. 
• Identify the short-term spatial costs caused by the deployment of an 
increasing amount of renewable technologies. 
• Develop representative scenarios to depict the GB power system in 2015.  
• Build an economic model for assessing the effects upon generators 
(especially renewables) of adopting different locational signals. 
• Use the model to investigate the difference between locational marginal 
pricing and less economically efficient pricing approaches (e.g. uniform 
pricing) in terms of welfare, prices and energy results (e.g. total demand). 
• Study both supply and demand behaviour under different pricing approaches. 
• Understand how optimal spatial pricing might help achieve an economically 
efficient electricity system, given the constraints set by environmental 
policies. 
• Provide useful information to the decision-making process in the area of 
market architecture, including spatial pricing methodologies. 
1.4. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
1.4.1. Methodology 
Addressing this topic presents, among others, two major difficulties. Firstly, it 
is widely known that, in spite of the fact that academics have known for many years 
which form of spatial pricing is considered the optimal one from an economic per-
spective, the latter has been adopted only in very few electricity systems worldwide. 
That may well raises the question of whether nodal pricing simply represents a pure 
“academic exercise”, which is an argument frequently encountered in economic the-
ory (e.g. when perfect competition is assumed). Therefore it appears particularly im-
portant to try and model a real electricity system, rather than a virtual one, as it is of-
ten the case in this type of studies (e.g. a 6-node virtual network). Furthermore, it 
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seems equally relevant to use the same power system to compare the status quo, i.e. 
uniform pricing, with its nodal version, which is considered more efficient but it is 
also relatively new.  
The second difficulty lies in the main research question itself, i.e. the alleged 
conflict between transmission policy and renewable policy. In fact it may be argued 
that the need for locational signals only arises from reasons of economic efficiency 
whilst renewable energy is developed mostly because of the need to reduce 
pollutants (but also to contribute to security of supply). It seems that such a “limited 
interpretation” of these issues could carry the embedded risk of pushing the PhD into 
a methodological error. That is, answering the research question would simply 
become a matter of choosing either locational signals or renewables. Instead the PhD 
tries to ensure that these two issues are reconciled: adopting efficient forms of spatial 
pricing may contribute to reduce carbon emissions (e.g. by reducing transmission 
losses) while building renewables in certain locations may help to reduce network 
costs and thus to make the electricity system more efficient. 
For instance, if brown and green electricity3 are considered as two different 
goods to be consumed, then classic microeconomic theory suggests that a balance in 
consumption is always preferred. Indeed the axiom of strict convexity requires that 
consumers strictly prefer any relatively balanced consumption bundle to both of the 
extremes between which he/she is indifferent (Jehle & Reny, 2001). If applied to the 
electricity case, the latter would mean that consumers prefer to use both green and 
brown electricity, which seems reasonable since consuming only renewable 
electricity would be financially (and physically) unsustainable while relying only 
upon fossil-fuelled electricity would be environmentally unsustainable. In terms of 
Figure 4, strict convexity also means that a balanced consumption bundle like “X2” 
will always be preferred to other extremes, like “X1” and “X3”. 
Therefore it is believed that a good way for answering the research question 
while overcoming this second hurdle – i.e. the risk of considering spatial pricing and 
                                                 
3
 When green electricity is penalized by locational signals (e.g. on-shore wind in Scotland), brown 
electricity, i.e. fossil-fuelled (e.g. CCGT in South of England) may be seen as the only alternative 
from an economic perspective (e.g. lower network costs).   
Optimal spatial pricing for electricity and its impact on renewable generation technologies and 
their operations  
 21 
renewables as two completely different sets of issues – may be to develop a quantita-
tive model, which addresses both issues at the same time and with the same weigh.   
 
Figure 4 An example of convexity in consumer theory 
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This clearly implies that such quantitative model represents the main pillar in 
this thesis. In particular, the following methodology has been adopted: 
• Study the relevant literature review in order to understand the main policy 
issue and identify a suitable modelling approach.  
• Specify and test a theoretical model to ensure that the “mechanics” works. 
• Identify a suitable software package for solving the problem in the model. 
• Consult on a regular basis with academics (e.g. mathematicians, economists 
and electrical engineers) and practitioners (e.g. system operators and 
regulators) whose expertise is relevant to this PhD. 
• Collect data for the model from a variety of sources: e.g. recent market 
reports, journals’ articles and various forms of communications with industry 
stakeholders. 
• Prepare the data into suitable inputs for the model. 
• Build the model, including software’s programming.  
• Carry out several test runs and submit the preliminary results to relevant 
experts for feedback. 
• Implement feedback from experts. 
• Run the model across all scenarios and sensitivities. 
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• Analyse modelling results and their policy implications. 
• Final conclusions and recommendations. 
1.4.2. Model 
The following section sets out general assumptions for the model, full details 
are provided in Chapter 3. As anticipated in section 1.4.1, it is believed that 
developing a quantitative model is an appropriate way to strengthen this PhD’s 
analysis while addressing network policy and renewable policy on a level playing 
field. The question is clearly what kind of model may be right. 
Ventosa et al. (2005) presents an exhaustive survey of the most relevant 
publications regarding electricity market modelling and identifies the most suitable 
approaches for conducting various types of planning studies or market analysis.  
First of all, it appears that an economic model should be developed since both 
policies can be assessed in terms of economic values: e.g. the shadow price of 
avoided carbon emissions in the case of renewable energy and the shadow price of 
transmission constraint in the case of network policy. Secondly, a general 
equilibrium analysis is thought to be unsuitable to this research problem since the 
latter is not concerned with questions of resource allocation in the economy as a 
whole, neither with the way all markets reach equilibrium simultaneously (Estrin & 
Laidler, 1995). Instead, since the focus is on the electricity market alone4, it appears 
that a model based on partial equilibrium theory may be appropriate. That is, it is 
assumed that the interactions between the electricity market and all other markets are 
sufficiently minor that to neglect them does not undermine the validity of the 
conclusions reached through the model. And because this PhD is concerned with all 
types of generators but not with their strategic behaviour, a partial equilibrium model 
with perfect competition and considering all firms is more suitable than its 
alternatives (e.g. single firm optimization model). 
Moreover, since the key issue is the effect of changes in policies, it appears that 
a welfare analysis applied to a partial equilibrium model may be a good choice. Be-
                                                 
4
 It must be pointed out though that electricity markets are always closely related to fuel and carbon 
markets, but in this particular context their prices will be treated as static exogenous variables. 
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cause economic efficiency cannot be achieved unless the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus is maximised, it follows that a model optimizing social welfare may be 
used in these circumstances (Jehle & Reny, 2001). Indeed it should be stressed that 
optimization models have been borrowed extensively by the electricity industry for 
problems like planning system operation and/or expansion, price forecasting and rate 
designing (Rau, 2003). 
Therefore the aim is to develop a bottom-up model, based on different forms of 
spatial pricing, for investigating the optimal use of resources (including renewables), 
determined by welfare economics and considering network’s physical characteristics. 
Because of the latter, such model must combine both electrical engineering and 
economic theories. Finally it should noted that other studies (e.g. Stigler & Todem 
(2005) and Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen (2008)) in the same research area 
have adopted a similar modelling approach. 
1.5. DATA 
Both quantitative and qualitative types of data have to be researched in order to 
complete this thesis (including investigating the research question), as shown in 
Table 25. With regards to quantitative data, this represents the inputs to the model 
developed in this thesis. Because of the particular nature of the model, i.e. a social 
welfare maximization of the British electricity system in 2015, based on DC Load 
Flow principles, two different types of data are required for running the latter: 
• Economic and financial, such as generation costs by technology (including 
fuel and carbon prices). 
 Sources: National Grid “Seven Year Statement”, the International 
Energy Agency, the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Scottish 
Government, the British energy regulator (Ofgem), specialized 
consultancies (e.g. Redpoint Energy), UK Energy Research Council 
(UKERC), the World Bank, etc..   
2. Electrical engineering, such as network admittance matrix. 
                                                 
5
 All items in this table have been researched before deciding whether to implement them (e.g. carbon 
costs) or ignore them (e.g. fixed O&M costs). 
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 Sources: National Grid “Seven Year Statement”, specialized 
consultancies (e.g. PB Power) and internal information from the 
Department of Electrical Engineering at Imperial College London.  
With regards to qualitative data, which are listed under “Methodologies” in 
Table 2, this has been mainly supplied by two sources: personal communications 
with experts (e.g. practitioners and academics) and a literature review (e.g. peer-
reviewed articles on optimal spatial pricing).  
 
Table 2 Data researched for the model 
Generation Network Methodologies
2015 total installed capacity Representation of network Electricity demand
Aggregation by technology (with availability) Mapping to NGC network Consumer surplus
Aggregation by operation (e.g. baseload) Admittance matrix Wind profile
Distributed generation Branch admittance matrix Additional lines (fixed costs)
Carbon content per MWh by technology Network incidence matrix Additional wind (fixed costs)
Carbon price Branch resistance matrix Carbon cost
Interconnectors capacity Chosen swing bus DCLF approach
Fuel costs 2015 boundary limits Nodal pricing model
Variable O&M Cross-border power flows Uniform pricing model
Fixed O&M costs Potential expansions Zonal pricing model
No-load costs Maintenance costs Fuel price seasonality
Start-up costs Nr of lines Supply function
Load factors Nr of nodes Meshed vs. radial network
Planned outages Reactance per line Demand function
Non-planned outages Resistance per line (losses) Pricing wind (e.g. ROC vs. "0")
LCPD assumptions (which coal running) Power Transfer Distrib. Factors Role of distrib.gener. for renewable target
Annuity new line Calculating losses
Voltage angles
Susceptance
N-1 reliability constraint
Availability
Demand Wind
Half-hourly profile Half-hourly profile
Nodal distribution 2015 installed capacity
2015 peak demand Nodal distribution
2015 peak demand NET of transm.losses Selected wind conditions
Nr of typical days Link to demand values
Nr of block of hours per day Cost
Duration Annuity new wind
Load duration curve
Elasticity values
Reference prices for to build demand curve
Losses in 2015
Reference demand to build demand curve
 
1.6. OUTPUTS 
Addressing the research question, which is the main aim of this PhD, has led to 
produce the following outputs, included in this thesis: 
• A technical analysis of market design and spatial pricing; 
• A critical review of the current literature; 
• A critical review of different models for electricity pricing; 
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• A quantitative comparison of different forms of spatial pricing in a power 
system constrained by a low-carbon policy (renewable target and carbon 
price); 
• An analysis of the economic and operational impact of LMP upon low-carbon 
generators. 
• An optimization model which tries to reconcile theory and practice; 
• A series of policy recommendations with regards to the interactions between 
network policy and renewable policy.  
• A series of suggestions for further research. 
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Following this introduction, the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2, in the first part, gives an overview of what is meant by locational 
signals and how these may be implemented in the electricity industry through 
different types of market designs. Then literature, documents and papers relevant to 
the research question are reviewed in the last three sections, divided by subject: 
network policy, renewable policy and a combination of the two.  
Chapter 3, delivering one of the core objectives of the thesis, focuses on the 
modelling of the British electricity market. The first section describes those features 
of the latter which may be relevant to the research question. Then all different stages 
of the model’s development are explained: from the initial conception with the 
critique of different approaches to the model’s final structure and implementation 
into the optimization software.   
Chapter 4 is divided in two parts. The first one presents and critically analyzes 
all the modelling results, including all the scenarios and the sensitivities, described in 
the previous chapter. The second one synthesises the modelling results and tries to 
draw from them some key policy implications. 
Following the findings of the previous section, Chapter 5 attempts to answer 
the research question, with frequent references to the current debates in the UK (e.g. 
government’s consultation on a new renewable energy strategy). Moreover, this final 
chapter emphasizes the strengths and limitations of this PhD. Finally, it is suggested 
that further research should be carried out in a few areas (e.g. renewables’ contribu-
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tion to energy security, market power caused by transmission constraints) in order to 
improve this PhD’s analysis.  
This first chapter has introduced what the research problem seems to be, i.e. a 
potential conflict between the objectives of an efficient network policy and those of a 
renewable policy. This has been followed by a section explaining why this PhD may 
be seen as relevant and original. Then the next two sections have outlined the aim 
and objectives that this thesis would like to achieve and its methodology. Two more 
sections have described the input required by this thesis and the outputs produced 
respectively. Finally, the structure of the thesis (i.e. six chapters) has been set out.  
Before proceeding with the core modelling analysis, it is essential to try to 
know more about market design and spatial pricing in general, which is in the focus 
of the following chapter. 
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2. CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON 
NETWORKS AND RENEWABLE POLICY 
The purpose of this section is to provide a critical review of the literature where 
spatial pricing and renewables seem to meet. This chapter is structured as follows: 
part one (2.1) sets out an introduction to locational pricing; part two (2.2) highlights 
some of the key publications in the area of network policy; part three (2.3) focuses 
on the literature addressing renewable policy, with particular reference to the British 
electricity market; the last part (2.4) analyses some of the publications which contain 
elements from both types of policies. 
2.1. AN INTRODUCTION TO LOCATIONAL SIGNALS 
2.1.1. A general overview 
According to Schweppe et al. (1988) electricity must be treated as a 
commodity which can be purchased, sold and traded taking into account its TIME- 
and SPACE-varying values and costs. The time dimension seems to have been 
adequately addressed by the current electricity market arrangements: the price of 
both energy and power is expressed in £/MWh and, depending on the system, there 
are different time-dependent electricity markets, such as day-ahead, real-time and 
forward6.  
On the other hand, it appears that modern power systems are still struggling 
with the spatial dimension of their only commodity. All things being equal (e.g. unit 
cost of generation), the value of electricity varies by location due to the fact that it 
must be transported (via either the distribution or the transmission network) from the 
point of generation to the point of consumption. Furthermore transporting electricity 
is a function which has economic consequences on the whole power system in terms 
of: 
• Losses, which are caused by heat; 
                                                 
6
 One key exception is represented by real-time pricing, also known as peak-load pricing, which, in 
spite of its economic efficiency, has not been applied to the retail sector on a large scale (Holland & 
Mansur, 2006).  
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• Infrastructures (e.g. lines and substations), that must be built, operated and 
maintained; 
• System balance between demand and supply, which must be met at all times; 
this issue is made more complex by the fact that power transfer in a particular 
direction may impact line flows in large portion of the system.  
• Congestion management, which is necessary since the level of utilization 
must never exceed the lines’ maximum capacity for safety reasons. 
Within a restructured electricity system, all these spatial issues are introduced 
into its pricing methodology by means of locational signals (which leads to spatial 
pricing): these may be defined as economic incentives that are given to market 
players to reflect their geo graphical situation, in order to influence trading decisions 
(short-term effect) and investments (long-term effect).  
A locational energy price in particular represents the real cost of buying/selling 
electricity in an area (zone or node) of the network. Such signals (e.g. locational 
marginal prices or LMP) have typically a short-term effect: they lead to the efficient 
operation of the system, based on the current level of investments, i.e. generators and 
loads react to price signals reflecting the real cost of supplying electricity in different 
areas. In particular, in a nodal pricing (also known as LMP) system, the price for 
electricity may differ by node for reasons of congestion and marginal losses in 
transmission. 
Although short-term locational signals may contribute to the recovery of up to 
20-30% of network costs, the majority of them are recovered via transmission tariffs 
(CESI, 2003). Moreover use-of-system tariffs can be designed so that spatial 
differences in charges are used to provide long-term locational signals to market 
players, by means of signalling the optimality of their location in the network. This 
solution is typically adopted by markets like the UK that send no short-term signals 
as there is a single uniform wholesale electricity price for consumers and generators 
(Hunt, 2002). 
Locational signals may also be implemented through the use of deep 
connection charges, where each generator is charged not only for the direct costs of 
grid connection (as in shallow charging) but also for the indirect cost of the network 
reinforcements caused by the generator’s connection. 
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One of the key requirements for investing in generating capacity is the avail-
ability of access to the networks, which allows generators to reach both wholesale 
markets and final consumers. Because of this, restructured electricity systems always 
face a twofold question: 
• How many lines (and substations) must be built and where? 
• Who is going to pay for the construction of these new lines and the operation 
of the whole network system? 
The answer to both questions depends, among other things, on which form of 
spatial pricing is adopted, i.e. on how locational signals are implemented into the 
market architecture. Indeed the way network costs are allocated through spatial 
pricing may play a relevant role in stimulating “adequate” investments in generating 
capacity and, ultimately, in setting the final electricity bill borne by consumers. 
2.1.2. The GB electricity market 
On 1st April 2005, the introduction of BETTA (the British Electricity Trading 
and Transmission Arrangements) created a single British market for wholesale 
electricity (Ofgem, 2005). BETTA effectively extended to Scotland the previous 
market arrangements that had been operational in England and Wales under NETA 
(the New Electricity Trading Arrangements) since 2001. BETTA specifies the rules 
for selling, purchasing and transmitting wholesale electricity and is based on bilateral 
trading between generators, suppliers, traders and customers across a series of 
markets operating on a rolling half-hourly basis (NGC, 2009a). Other main features 
of BETTA are the following: 
• One System Operator (SO), i.e. NGC (National Grid Company), which is 
independent from any commercial interest in the wholesale and retail 
markets; NGC is also responsible for developing proposals – to be approved 
by Ofgem – on how to charge grid users.  
• Three Transmission Owners (TO), i.e. NGC in England & Wales and Scottish 
Power Transmission and Scottish Hydroelectric Transmission in Scotland; 
under the RPI-X (retail price index minus an efficiency factor) form of price 
controls the companies’ revenues are fixed. 
• Balancing Mechanism, i.e. the market which operates from gate closure 
through to real time and ensures that supply and demand are continuously 
matched, taking account of transmission constraints. 
• Two imbalance prices, i.e. System Buy Price (SBP) and System Sell Price 
(SSP), which serve as an incentive for market participants to ensure that their 
physical and contracted positions are balanced prior to gate closure. 
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A key aspect of BETTA is the introduction of a single set of arrangements for 
connecting to and using the GB transmission network. In particular NGC currently 
raises three types of transmission charges (NGC, 2009c): 
• Connection Charges, with no locational signals. These are site-specific asset-
based charges that need to fund the establishment and maintenance of assets 
that form the immediate connection of a directly connected transmission user. 
Moreover, NGC has adopted a “super shallow” methodology, under which 
assets that are shared by more than one user are not included in these charges. 
• Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges, with no locational 
signals. These £/MWh tariffs are levied on generators and suppliers and 
reflect the costs of keeping the system in balance and of maintaining the 
quality and security of supply. BSUoS charges include, among others, the 
costs arising from Balancing Mechanism, congestion management and 
transmission losses. 
• Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges, with locational 
signals. These are applied to generation capacity and half-hourly and non 
half-hourly metered demand and provide most of the funding necessary to 
develop and maintain the GB network. 
TNUoS charges currently represent the only form of form of locational signals 
in the GB system. They are defined on a zonal basis and depend on the balance of 
generation and demand, split into 21 and 14 different charging zones respectively, at 
different points on the system. TNUoS tariff is the sum of the following: 
• A locationally varying element, whose incremental cost is based on average 
unit costs for the transmission technology most likely to be used.  
• A non-locationally varying element, which is calculated so that the total 
revenue from TNUoS charges is equal to that allowed under the price control 
and is split between generation and demand in the ratio of 27: 73.                                                 
TNUoS charges provide long-term locational signals with a significant strength 
both for generators and demand: e.g. a generator Northern Scotland currently has to 
pay up to 22 £/kW for using the transmission system while a generator in the South 
West is actually paid up to 7 £/kW for using the same network. Similarly, but with 
opposite direction, a consumer in Northern Scotland pays only 4 £/kW, while another 
customer in the South West zone is charged 26 £/kW for using the grid. 
With regards to transmission losses, their cost is averaged across all users 
(45:55 between generation and demand) via BSUoS charges, which means that they 
are not efficiently allocated. In other words for NGC a new 100 MW power plant in 
the north is only worth 94 MW to the system due to transmission losses, whereas the 
same plant built in the south coast is worth 106 MW (Milborrow, 2003). Finally, 
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transmission constraints are primarily managed by NGC through re-balancing of the 
power flows in the locality of the constraint: NGC accepts bids and offers in the bal-
ancing market, implementing counter-trading for congestion management; the corre-
sponding costs are then recovered from all participants via the BSUoS charges, on 
the basis of their metered volumes, without sending any locational signal. 
2.2. NETWORK POLICY 
According to Eydeland & Wolyniec (2003), one of the biggest challenges of 
organizing electricity markets is to ensure the delivery of an adequate amount of 
energy to the right location. Luckily this challenge had been “accepted” by a few 
researchers almost twenty years ago. It is widely recognized that thanks to the path-
breaking works of Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992), economists have been 
able to design optimal transmission pricing rules (Bernard & Guertin, 2002).  
Indeed the economic rationale for applying marginal cost pricing to an 
electricity network using the concepts of locational marginal pricing (LMP) was first 
presented in Schweppe et al. (1988). The latter argues that LMP approach is 
generally considered as the most efficient mechanism from an economic point of 
view while simultaneously obeying physical laws of electricity networks.  It is based 
upon a social welfare maximization objective, subject to production and transmission 
capacity constraints while taking into account line losses, loop flows, and reliability 
criteria. Moreover, the first-order conditions associated with this maximization 
problem yield the so-called nodal prices (or LMP), i.e. the electricity prices to be 
paid by users and received by producers at each node to maximise the economic 
benefits. The theory of optimal spatial pricing is further developed in Hsu (1997). 
The latter recognizes that one of the main features of an electricity network is that, 
due to physical laws, actions by one party can have a significant impact on other 
participants. This feature is best described by the concept of network externality, 
which can be either positive (e.g. reducing congestion on one line) or negative (e.g. 
increasing system transmission losses). 
Feng & Fuller (2005) compares nodal, zonal and uniform marginal pricing but 
in terms of distribution rather than levels of economic surplus among producers and 
consumers. In other words, nodal pricing is used to calculate an optimal power flow, 
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which maximizes social surplus and determines the actual dispatch. But then the 
prices that are used for financial settlements are from uniform and zonal pricing with 
the same data, i.e. dispatch. Not surprisingly, there is no loss in social surplus by 
adopting a uniform or a zonal approach for settlements, with a nodal pricing dis-
patch. However, the total social surplus is distributed differently in the uniform or 
zonal marginal pricing approaches than in a settlement system based on nodal mar-
ginal pricing. Indeed Ault, Elders, & Green (2007) suggests that the choice between 
alternative spatial pricing rules can lead to large transfers of shares of costs between 
network users. Thus, changing an established network policy may be politically dif-
ficult. 
Nodal can be used to determine the value of transmission rights that can then 
be sold to market participants (Hogan, 1992). It also follows that transmission prices 
calculated according to optimal spot pricing theory should incorporate the marginal 
cost of generation, the marginal cost of losses, and the opportunity cost created by 
congestion in the system. The way congestion and LMP works is clearly explained in 
Stoft (2002). This form of implicit auctioning is quite relevant. Indeed transmission 
rights (TRs) are not bundled with energy but are traded separately. To sell and 
transmit power from node A to node B, either the buyer or the seller must own the 
transmission right at least in the amount of the power sold. If the market for 
transmission rights is competitive, then the equilibrium price of a transmission right 
from A to B, P(AB)=P(B)-P(A). 
Combining the physics and the economics in models and analysis has for years 
been the standard way of analyzing electricity markets. Indeed congestion manage-
ment in the transmission network through locational prices or similar measures is 
often a key component of an electricity market design. This type of analysis may be 
applied to other commodities. Nesbitt (2009) argues that modelling world or conti-
nental natural gas, coal or electricity requires a representation of the spatial nature of 
such commodity markets. Moreover it suggests that spatial commodity models, if 
properly constructed, expose the underlying economic fundamentals, including 
prices and flows. However Midthun, Bjorndal, & Tomasgard (2009) argue that those 
papers addressing the economics of natural gas transportation have a straightforward 
representation of gas flows, without considering the special physical properties of the 
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network flows. Furthermore their models focus mainly on the economic issues, and 
do not give a detailed description of the engineering aspects underlying natural gas 
transportation networks. In the electricity sector on the other hand, the effects of the 
physical power flows are typically taken into account when allocating transmission 
capacity and dispatching generating units.  
In Europe recently there have been interesting developments in terms of 
allocating scarce transmission capacity. Another form of implicit auctioning, also 
known as markets coupling, has replaced explicit auctioning in few selected power 
systems, specifically France, the Netherlands and Belgium (APX Group, 2007). 
Market coupling is a method used to manage cross-border grid congestions 
effectively. Power trading and allocating cross-border transmission capacity take 
place at the same time within this scheme. Under market coupling, cross-border day-
ahead capacity is implicitly auctioned among the three different wholesale markets. 
Therefore it is believed that such method facilitates power trading and promotes the 
continued integration of European electricity markets. 
Overall congestion management is widely considered as one of the most 
difficult problems in electricity market design. Stoft (2002) argues that, even though 
congestion costs may be quite low in a efficiently run power system, nevertheless 
badly designed congestion pricing can make the system unmanageable. Indeed this is 
what seems to have happened in the PJM market: in June 1997 a form of average 
cost pricing had resulted in massive gaming of the pricing rules until the system 
operator had to intervene by restricting the market and constraining choice to 
preserve reliability (Hogan, 1999). According to Hsu (1997) there is only one 
efficient way to manage congestion and that is to charge for the use of a congested 
line so that those who value that line most get to use it and its capacity is not wasted. 
Moreover Hunt (2002) argues that nodal prices are the only set of efficient 
congestion prices while Dietrich et al. (2005)  believes that this particular form of 
transmission pricing increasingly represents the benchmark for congestion 
management due to its simplicity, effectiveness in practice and its compliance with 
both economic theory and physical laws. 
It is often suggested that in liberalised electricity markets one of the most im-
portant tasks of the SO is to carry out congestion management, that can be efficiently 
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achieved through a nodal pricing approach (Stamtsis & Erlich, 2004). From this per-
spective, it is interesting to notice that National Grid Company, in its role as system 
operator, expected to face in 2008 a bill of £ 170 million for congestion management, 
i.e. 17% of all forecasted external costs (Ofgem, 2008). 
Marginal cost is very important also in the area of transmission losses. In fact 
Liu & Zobian (2002) argues that the loss component, if accurately priced using 
marginal cost methods, leads to a more efficient dispatch, as each market player will 
see a price for losses that exactly reflects the incremental cost of transmission arising 
from their contribution to power flows: generators placed closer to their load 
experience an advantage over farther generators, which must transmit their power 
over longer distances to reach the load served. It seems appropriate to highlight the 
fact, in spite of the fact that similar proposals have been rejected in the past, Ofgem 
tried on more than one occasions to introduce zonal charging for transmission losses 
(Ofgem, 2007b). 
It must be noted that the importance of a network lies also in the fact that 
transmission lines can act as both a substitute for and a complement to generation 
(Brunekreeft, 2003). This means that new lines increase competition between 
suppliers who may therefore oppose them, but they are a public good because they 
reduce market power. The typical example is the upgrade of an interconnector 
between two power systems which allow the importing country to avoid building an 
equivalent amount of generation capacity. 
With particular reference to the model proposed for this PhD, three publica-
tions in particular played a key contribution. The first one, Green (2007), develops a 
thirteen node model for the electricity system in England and Wales and shows how 
social welfare improves by moving from uniform pricing to optimal nodal pricing. 
The second one, Stigler & Todem (2005),  provides a good explanation of the DC 
Load Flow Model developed in Schweppe et al. (1988) and specifies a detailed opti-
mization model, based on welfare economics, of the Austrian grid. The third one, 
Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen, 2008 (2008), which builds on the previous 
two, carries out a welfare economics analysis of nodal pricing applied to the German 
electricity sector; the novelty here is that its model includes different levels of off-
shore wind energy, treated as exogenous variable. 
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Finally it should be noted that any discussion on efficient spatial pricing inevi-
tably falls into the wider debate about the benefits of wholesale competitive markets. 
Indeed according to Harvey, McConihe, & Pope (2006) the implementation of 
coordinated markets based on LMP pricing in two particular transmission 
organizations – PJM Interconnection and New York ISO – is producing rate 
reductions that are saving customers between $430 million and $1.3 billion per year. 
Further references in the area of transmission pricing may be found in Di 
Castelnuovo (2004a) and Brunekreeft, Neuhoff & Newbery (2005). 
2.3. RENEWABLE POLICY 
As argued by Jaccard (2005), in estimating the relative contribution of each 
energy option over this century, it is important not to confuse means and ends. The 
end is not an energy system dominated by either renewables or fossil fuels. Instead 
the end should be a low impact and low risk energy system, which is able to meet 
growing energy needs indefinitely and to do this as cheaply as possible, without 
leading to a global environmental disaster at some future time. With this sustainable 
energy system as the goal, it appears too early for an energy policy which rules out 
fossil fuels in favour or renewable and nuclear energy, before having compared 
different critical decision factors. These factors include the cost of each energy 
option, of course, but also the legitimate human desire to minimize the risk of 
extreme events (e.g. nuclear accident), to ensure adequate and reliable energy 
supplies and to sustain our current values, institutions and lifestyles. 
Indeed, according to Varela (2006), a growing gap between oil and gas supply 
and energy demand becomes evident after 2010; such gap, in the long term, should 
be filled inevitably with a mix of energy efficiency, renewables, coal and nuclear, 
and heat production from renewable sources. Furthermore Varela (2006) believes 
that wind power presents a key element of the solution, since it is rapid to deploy, 
low in environmental impact and low cost.. 
IEA (2007) suggests that renewables may provide a fundamental contribution 
to energy security, also thanks to the fact that, compared to traditional fossil-fuelled 
technologies, they can be deployed as small-scale or distributed type of generation 
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(e.g. small wind farms). Indeed centralised power generation is exposed to a larger 
set of supply security risks relative to distributed generation. However, in spite of 
several success stories in the area of distributed generation, current market reports 
clearly show that increasingly bigger wind farms, which have to be connected to the 
transmission system, are being developed around the world  (Ernst & Young Renew-
able Energy Group, 2009): e.g. in Texas the Roscoe Wind Farm with its 781MW is 
the world’s largest on-shore wind farm while the UK is developing the London Array 
1000MW off-shore wind farm. It seems fair to assume that all these huge power 
plants will have a significant effect on the network they connect to.  
With regards to the British electricity system, renewable technologies may play 
an even more vital role within its current and future energy policy (House of 
Commons - Environmental Audit Committee, 2006). The reason is twofold: first of 
all, like many other European countries, the UK is facing the unprecedented 
challenge of achieving radical reductions in carbon emissions in an effort to combat 
global warming—as reflected in the difficulty of achieving the country’s own 2010 
carbon reduction target. Secondly, and most importantly, it is likely that between 15 
and 20 GW of power plants will be decommissioned by 2016; this amounts to nearly 
a quarter of total UK generating capacity. This means that over the next 5 years very 
substantial investment in both new generating capacity and energy efficiency will be 
required if the lights are to stay on, even in the absence of demand growth. 
As far as the UK’s specific renewable target is concerned, it is likely that in the 
short-term both onshore and off-shore wind generation will provide the most 
significant contribution, especially because of the country’s excellent wind resources 
(both onshore and offshore) and the relatively advanced nature of wind generation 
technology (DECC, 2009a; Ofgem, 2007a; Redpoint Energy, 2009; SKM, 2008). 
Moreover it is interesting to notice that on the one hand the UK government assumes 
that its renewable target will not be met but on the other one 96% of the planned 
renewable capacity will come from either on-shore or off-shore wind (DTI & Ofgem, 
2006). 
Finally, since the British electricity market is the subject of this PhD’s model 
while the German has the world largest amount of wind energy, it seems relevant to 
make a brief comparison between the corresponding renewable policies. Indeed, it is 
more difficult to make a case for more efficient spatial pricing in an electricity mar-
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ket, like the UK one, which is already struggling to build renewables fast enough to 
meet its corresponding 2010 renewable target. Butler & Neuhoff (2007) compares 
support schemes for market based deployment of renewable energy in the two coun-
tries and shows that the Germany’s feed in tariff reduces costs to consumers and re-
sults in larger deployment compared to UK’s Renewable Obligation Certificates 
(ROCs).  
According to Szarka & Blühdorn (2006), the prices for wind energy in the UK  
- = wholesale price + green certificate - are considerably higher than the feed-in rates 
in Germany: 12–13 eurocents/kWh vs. 8-5 eurocents/kWh in 2005. Moreover, it is 
argued that this price differential is a sign of the problems associated with the ROC 
scheme: as wholesale electricity prices increase, subsidies should be phased out. 
Indeed, by looking at the renewables market during the period 2002–06 it appeared 
that not only that the ROC scheme is failing to produce a more cost-effective system 
than continental ‘feed-in tariffs’, but also, which is even worse, that the RO is 
making wind power progressively more expensive to the British consumer at a time 
when decreasing feed-in rates are making it cheaper in Germany (Szarka & 
Blühdorn, 2006). Furthermore this problem becomes even more serious, when 
considering Britain’s more abundant wind resources, which often translate into 
higher load factors, particularly in the North of the country (British Wind Energy 
Association, 2009; SKM, 2008; University of Edinburgh, 2006). Clearly such 
comparison would help those arguing against the possibility of further subsidy to 
British wind energy via discounted transmission tariffs.  
2.4. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NETWORK AND RENEWABLE POLICIES 
Following what argued in the previous paragraph regarding Jaccard (2005) – 
i.e. that renewables should be seen as a means rather than an end – it appears 
reasonable to try and gain a better understanding of  the “ total cost” arising from 
deploying renewable energy technologies into an electricity system. Indeed, besides 
the building costs of a renewable plant there are other cost factors which may seem 
less obvious but still contribute to the final bill: e.g. system balancing and system 
reliability costs, caused by intermittent renewable sources like wind (Anderson et al., 
2006); network costs, driven by the particular location of generators (Dale et al., 
2003).  
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According to GWEC & Greenpeace (2006) wind integration into the grid may 
lead to additional balancing costs in the order of 0 to 3 €/MWh for levels of wind 
power up to 20% and additional costs due to grid reinforcements/extension in the 
range of 0.1 to 4.7 €/MWh, the higher value corresponding to a wind penetration of 
30% in the UK system.  
As explained in 2.1, the latter type of costs can be revealed through the 
implementation of adequate locational signals into the pricing arrangements of a 
power system. Auer et al. (2006) argues that serious unbundling and correct 
allocation of renewables related grid integration costs only guarantee achieving the 
ambitious European renewable targets with minimal costs to society. It is also argued 
that such costs may be minimized: the economic benefit of expanding the spatial 
distribution of wind farms to reduce their intermittency is believed to exceed the 
costs of additional investments in transmission (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006).   
Allocating renewables-induced network costs in an efficient manner has 
already proven to be controversial. Indeed in 2005 the British government published 
a public consultation, in which it was proposed to reduce transmission charges 
applicable to renewables under development in the North of the country (DTI, 2005). 
Instead  Johnston, Neuhoff & Kavali (2007) suggests that, should renewables be 
supported by take-or pay contracts, then the system operator may reduce its network 
charges to consumers (not generators) thanks to the profit made by selling renewable 
energy purchased through those contracts. Most importantly Cust, Neuhoff & Keats 
(2007) argues that market designs that do not allow for locational differentiation to 
reflect transmission and planning constraints can increase overall costs to consumers.  
It should be noticed that choosing a particular portfolio of renewable technolo-
gies entails also, like for any consumption bundle, a more indirect cost (Council for 
Science and Technology, 2005). That is, any technological choice has an opportunity 
cost, since the financial resources allocated to a particular technology in a particular 
location (e.g.) could have been spent on another solution: e.g. an on-shore wind, lo-
cated far from the demand (e.g. North of Scotland) vs. a fossil-fuelled generator with 
carbon storage and sequestration, sited close to load pockets (e.g. South East Eng-
land). The general assumption of a budget constraint means that there isn’t enough 
money to deliver every energy option. 
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Overall electricity networks are more relevant to renewables and environ-
mental policy than commonly thought7. Indeed Ofgem’s annual Sustainable 
Development Report is a good example of how renewable and transmission policy 
may interact with each other (Ofgem, 2009c). In this document the British regulator 
says that its commitment towards making energy markets more sustainable is 
structured around five themes and fourteen indicators. Most importantly, at least six 
of these indicators, which have been developed to assess progress of sustainable 
development, are directly linked to network issues: 
• Greenhouse gas emission from the electricity sector: there are fugitive 
emissions from the electricity network of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), whose 
global warming potential is 22,200 times that of CO2, on a weight for weight 
basis. 
• Renewable electricity generation: transmission companies must make extra 
investments in the networks to accommodate increasing amount of renewable 
capacity; similarly distribution companies must connect distributed 
generation; moreover a new regulatory framework has been developed to 
meet the requirements of offshore wind generation. 
• Electricity losses: as part of the energy saving theme, networks should 
become more efficient so that less energy is used and losses. In addition to 
the financial cost there is also an environmental cost since the additional 
electricity –generated by burning fossil fuels – that is lost during 
transportation also adds to the emissions of greenhouse gases like carbon 
dioxide. 
• Reliability of supply – network performance: this indicator considers the 
number of interruptions of energy supply which consumers experience due to 
network failures; the electricity which is generated but not delivered 
represents an environmental cost due to the avoidable emissions. 
• Security and diversity of supply – market response: in the regulation of 
network companies specific incentives are set to deliver security of supply, 
which includes the connection of renewable energy sources.   
• Other impacts of electricity networks: these have an environmental cost in 
terms of visual intrusion, electric and magnetic fields, oil leaks from 
underground cables and general impact on wildlife. For instance a group of 
environmental consultants in the field of environmental economics were 
commissioned by Ofgem a research paper on the value of the visual impacts 
from electricity transmission. 
                                                 
7
 In this regard it may be worth mentioning the activities of the Electricity Networks Strategy Group, 
i.e. the UK Electricity Supply Industry focus group for network issues. And indeed the aim of such 
group is to identify, and co-ordinate work to address the technical, commercial, regulatory and other 
issues that affect the transition of electricity networks to a low-carbon future (see 
http://www.ensg.gov.uk). 
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Electricity losses in particular represent quite an important issue as the efficient 
allocation of their cost represent one of the foundations of optimal spatial pricing 
(Stoft, 2002). Transporting electricity, either at transmission or distribution level, 
will inevitably lead to certain amount of electrical losses as heat or noise throughout 
the network. Figure 5 shows that losses may represent a considerable percentage of 
the electricity demand in Great Britain: e.g. in 2004/05 around 5% and 2% on the 
distribution and transmission system respectively.  
Furthermore distribution losses are valued in the UK at around £900 million: 
this means for a domestic consumer’s bill total distribution charges account for 
around 25%, which includes about 5% for distribution losses alone, or around £15. 
With regards to transmission losses across the GB transmission system instead, they 
have historically been around 2%. This is reflected in a cost of around £250m each 
year (Ofgem, 2007b). This cost is expected to rise due to the increasing amount of 
renewable energy being developed in the North of the country (Ofgem, 2008).  
However, there are several measures that can be adopted to reduce these losses: 
e.g. more effective network configuration, locational signals, investment in low loss 
equipment and management of peak loads. With regards to Great Britain, Figure 5 
also shows that losses have been declining in recent years at distribution level as the 
companies respond to incentives for managing losses in the price control set by the 
regulator. It is not clear yet whether these economic incentives will be adequate to 
cope with the increasing amount of renewable generation connecting at a distribution 
level. 
Jaccard (2005) suggests that it is very important to maintain a realistic view of 
the options which represent alternatives to fossil fuels, i.e. energy efficiency, nuclear 
power and renewable energy. In particular the latter is characterised by low energy 
density, variability of output (=intermittency) and inconvenient location. Moreover 
renewable energy often requires dedicated facilities for energy concentration (e.g. 
wind farm), storage (e.g. dams) and transmission. And as the contribution from re-
newables grows in scale, the environmental and financial cost of these facilities will 
become more of an issue. Indeed it may be argued that renewables advocates tend to 
underestimate the underlying challenges only because renewables have such small 
impacts today when they still represent only a fraction of global energy supply. 
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WBCSD (2006) rightly points out that many countries have support schemes for re-
newable energy, but these incentives have tended to focus on generation, rather than 
transmission, distribution and additional energy storage capacity. Such inefficiency 
creates bottlenecks and instabilities, which, at the same time, do not allow optimal 
use of the installed renewable capacity.  
Figure 5 Electricity transmission and distribution losses in Great Britain (Ofgem, 2009c) 
 
Finally, the increasing interaction between network and renewable policies, 
seem to be confirmed by the fact that several system operator or transmission com-
panies publish reports on wind energy, rather than on other technologies, on a regular 
basis. A recent report from the European Association of system operators shows that 
wind energy has become one of the key issues for analysing almost every European 
electricity system  (ETSO, 2007). In Germany, which has the largest amount of in-
stalled wind energy, Eon Netz (2005)  says that almost 200 Euro million have to be 
invested in the network due solely to wind power induced grid congestion. And NGC 
(2006) clearly states that the objective of the paper is to examine the transmission 
policy issues around wind and renewable sources of generation. Most importantly the 
latter argues that operating techniques for intermittent generation, properly structured 
market rules, and effective transmission policies for regional planning, cost alloca-
tion, and cost recovery and incentives will help to support the development of re-
newable energy. 
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3. MODELLING THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY 
MARKET 
The aim of this chapter is to present the development of an equilibrium model 
which is able to investigate how the following two objectives affect each other: 
• A more economically efficient electricity system, to be achieved by adopting 
more efficient spatial pricing. 
• A more environmentally sustainable electricity system, to be achieved with a 
large penetration of on- and off-shore wind energy. 
In particular, the chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part, paragraphs 3.1 
and 3.2 describe how the model has been developed from a theoretical perspective 
(e.g. social welfare maximization in a competitive power system). In the second one, 
the remaining paragraphs outline how the model has been built in practice (e.g. 
definition of scenarios for the British electricity market). 
3.1. WHAT IS THE MODEL REQUIRED TO DO?  
It is hoped that the modelling results may illustrate the effects of pricing ar-
rangements which are more cost-reflective, by means of locational signals. Based on 
the approach adopted in similar studies – e.g. Jeske, Weigt, Freund (2005) – it is pro-
posed to analyse such effects in terms of social welfare (or social surplus), which is 
equal to the sum of consumer and producer surplus (as shown in Figure 6). Indeed, 
different market designs are usually rated by economists in terms of efficiency, 
which may be measured by social welfare (Ehrenmann & Smeers, 2005). In particu-
lar, consumer surplus is equal to the difference between the market price and the 
price they would have been willing to pay, as represented by the demand curve. Pro-
ducer surplus8 is defined as the difference between the market price and the variable 
cost of production, summed over output. Mathematically speaking, social welfare 
can also be represented as the difference between the total benefit to consumers, 
which is the area under the demand curve, minus the total cost of production, which 
                                                 
8
 It must be pointed that producer surplus and profit coincide only in the long-run, when all costs are 
variable. In the short-run low variable cost generators have higher producer surplus than high variable 
cost generators, BUT profits depend on both variable and fixed costs of the two types of generators. 
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is the area under the supply curve. Most importantly, welfare is greatest when the 
market price is equal to the marginal cost of the last unit sold (Varian, 2003). In this 
specific case social surplus represents the surplus to society from the provision of 
electrical energy. In other words if all parties, both transmission and distribution 
connected, face the total costs they impose on the network, then it is generally as-
sumed that this would make the electricity system more efficient in terms of opera-
tions and investments (Schweppe et al., 1988). Ultimately more cost effective deci-
sions should lead to a cheaper electricity bill for final consumers while still meeting 
the renewable target. As part of that it is important to include in the model a selection 
of renewable technologies and suitable sites.  
 
Figure 6 Supply and demand function 
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As anticipated in the introductory chapter, this model focuses on the British 
electricity market, where the adoption of optimal spatial pricing such as LMP is 
bound not to produce a Pareto improvement, in the sense that there would be winners 
(e.g. consumers in the north) and losers (e.g. generators in the north). But what really 
matters is to assess whether further locational signals may lead to a more efficient 
solution in terms of higher social welfare. More generally, it should be possible to 
use such a model to investigate how operation and investments in generation capac-
ity are affected by different forms of spatial pricing: e.g. would LMP instead of uni-
form pricing lead to a drop in the capacity factor of a wind farm located at a con-
gested bus (operational issues)? Would LMP lead to lower intermittent capacity be-
ing built (investment issues)? 
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It is important to try and answer this type of question so that network policy is 
not blamed for the potential shortcomings of a renewable policy. The latter is not 
modelled directly. Instead a renewable target is represented in the model by a pre-
defined combination of renewable technologies and locations, based on recent 
estimates (e.g. NGC (2009b)) and industry inputs (e.g. direct communications with 
NGC). The model’s output is then used to assess whether the same electricity system, 
with the same installed capacity of renewable energy, is able to produce a higher 
social welfare when more efficient spatial pricing such as nodal pricing is introduced 
than otherwise.  
Any analysis looking at the economics of transmission should always take into 
account that the overall costs of a transmission network include the following 
components (Hsu, 1997): 
• Returns and depreciation on the capital. 
• Operation and maintenance to ensure that the network is reliable and secure. 
• Losses incurred when power is transmitted on the wires. 
• Opportunity costs of system constraints. 
Ideally transmission charges should equal the short-run marginal cost of 
providing the service. However, due to the increasing returns to scale characteristics 
of a transmission network, marginal cost pricing may not provide sufficient revenues 
to cover capital costs and rate of return on investment. That is why spatial pricing 
like LMP should be coupled with some form of revenue reconciliation, like a usage 
independent connection charge. This result should not come as a surprise since even 
hourly spot prices of electricity are defined in terms of marginal costs subject to 
revenue reconciliation, i.e. full recovery of operating and embedded capital costs 
(Schweppe et al., 1988). As argued by Cust, Neuhoff & Keats (2007), revenue 
reconciliation could be modelled by increasing construction costs of different 
generation technologies in the model. 
At the end, the modelling results should show which form of network pricing 
leads to a higher social welfare. Also individual results for consumers and producers 
are to be included: e.g. it may well be that producers are better off in one pricing 
mechanism even though social welfare is higher in the other one. Indeed this type of 
information may be particularly relevant for policymakers who have to decide on the 
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introduction of more efficient forms of locational signals. From this perspective it 
seems relevant to point out that Ofgem has tried for many years without success to 
introduce zonal charging for transmission losses (Ofgem, 2007b).   
Most importantly, the model does not try to replicate the full detail of NGC’s 
electrical system, but the simplified representation developed is designed to behave 
similarly to the latter in response to changes in generation and/or demand. The aim of 
this model is not to calculate accurate nodal prices at certain times, but to investigate 
how different forms of transmission pricing could affect the efficiency of an 
electricity system which needs to deliver a certain amount of renewable energy and 
maintain a minimum level of energy security. 
3.2. HOW CAN THIS PROBLEM BE MODELLED IN THEORY? 
This report introduces an optimization model for an electricity market which 
includes, among other elements, both transmission and renewable energy issues. This 
model relies upon the following four pillars: 
• Optimization methods are used for welfare maximizations.  
• Nodal pricing is used for investigating the optimal use of existing resources. 
• Demand functions are used for calculating nodal prices.  
• DC Load flow equations are used for taking the physical properties of the 
network into account. 
 
3.2.1. Optimization approach 
Optimization refers to finding one or more feasible solutions which 
corresponds to extreme values of one or more objectives, usually, but not always, 
subject to some constraints on the independent variable(s) (Pemberton & Rau, 2001). 
Moreover, when an optimization model has to be specified, several criteria must be 
chosen (as shown in Figure 7), depending on the characteristics of the problem to be 
modelled (e.g. the presence of constraints) and the available resources (e.g. 
optimization software). 
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Figure 7 Choosing among different criteria for the optimization problem 
 Single Objective
vs.
Multiple Objectives
Single Variable
vs.
Multiple Variables
Linear
vs.
Non-linear
OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEM
Discrete Time
vs.
Continuous Time
Static
vs.
Dynamic
Constrained
vs.
Unconstrained
 
With regards to the problem to be modelled for this PhD, the following criteria 
have been chosen: 
• Constrained, due to the presence of physical limits (e.g. line capacity). 
• Non-linear, due to the way power flows and losses are calculated. 
• Multiple variables, since the problem needs several n-dimension variables 
(e.g. demand and generation by node). 
• Static, because the object of this exercise is not how the system moves from 
one equilibrium but to analyse a particular equilibrium9; furthermore, power 
flows are assumed constant during one hour.  
• Continuous time, because the greater complexity of discrete time would add 
little value to this problem, and the continuous approach allows the use of 
calculus, simplifying the analysis. 
• Single Objective, because the aim is to maximize social welfare under a 
serious of constraints. 
With regards to the type of results (i.e. the set of values for the decision vari-
ables) that may be produced by the model, any solution for which all of the con-
straints in the problem are satisfied is called a feasible solution. That is, an optimal 
                                                 
9
 Indeed the purpose of comparative Statics, which one of the most important aspects of Equilibrium 
Analysis, is to analyse the effects on endogenous variable (e.g. generation output) of changes in ex-
ogenous variables (e.g. reference demand).  
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solution is a feasible solution where the objective function reaches its maximum (or 
minimum) value. A globally optimal solution is one where there are no other feasible 
solutions with better objective function values. A locally optimal solution is one 
where there are no other feasible solutions “in the vicinity” with better objective 
function. 
Furthermore, the types of mathematical relationships between the objective and 
constraints and the decision variables determine how hard it is to solve, the solution 
methods or algorithms that can be used for optimization and the confidence that the 
solution is globally optimal. The key property of functions that makes a problem 
easy or difficult to solve is convexity. Graphically, a function of one variable is 
convex if, at any two points x and y, the line drawn from x to y lie on or above the 
function. A function is concave if the chord from x to y lies on or below the function. 
If all constraints in a problem are convex functions of the variables, and if the 
objective is convex if minimizing, or concave if maximizing, then it is expected to 
find a globally optimal solution (or determining that there is no feasible solution), 
even if the problem is very large. Linear functions are convex, so linear 
programming problems are convex problems. In contrast, if any of the constraints are 
non-convex, or if the objective is either non-convex, concave if minimizing, or 
convex if maximizing, then the problem is far more difficult: there is no certainty of 
finding a feasible solution even if one exists; there is a dilemma of whether to “settle 
for” a locally optimal solution, or else be prepared for very long solution times and 
rather severe limits on the size of problems in the hope of finding global optimality, 
even on the fastest computers. 
Without the use of a computer, it would be rather difficult to determine 
whether the problem in this PhD is convex or not. Unfortunately, due to the 
mathematical relationships in the power flows equations, the optimization software 
would later reveal that this problem is actually non-convex, which would bring all 
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3.2.2. Spatial pricing approach 
The theory of spot pricing10, from which this PhD’s model is derived, as de-
fined in Schweppe et al (1988) is the most widely accepted one, at least in academia 
and it has been applied in many academic studies: Hogan (1992), Hsu (1997), Green 
(2004), Dietrich et al. (2005), and Stigler & Todem (2005), just to cite a few. 
According to this theory, electrical energy must be treated as a commodity, 
which can be purchased, sold and traded, taking into account its time- and space-
varying values and costs. The framework of an energy marketplace is based on the 
use of an hourly spot price ($/kWh), which reflects the operating and capital costs of 
generating, transmitting and distributing electricity; it varies each hour and from 
place to place.  
The hourly spot price is determined by the demand at that hour and by the 
hourly varying costs and capabilities of the generation, transmission and distribution 
system. Moreover this form of pricing is defined in terms of marginal costs subject to 
revenue reconciliation (i.e. recovery of operating and embedded capital costs).  
From an analytical perspective, the value of such spot price at any hour 
depends on the hourly variations of 
• Generation fuel (and now carbon!) costs and capacities. 
• Transmission network losses and capacities. 
• Aggregated customer demand patterns (including demand responses). 
From an economic perspective, the hourly spot price is given by the marginal 
cost of providing electricity to consumer k during hour t taking into consideration 
both operating and capital costs11, i.e.: 
  
 
                                                 
10
 Spot prices are known as nodal or locational marginal prices (LMP) if they reflect the system mar-
ginal costs and opportunity costs of network constraints. Ideally they should also include marginal 
losses. 
11
 Marginal cost based spot pricing tend to recover both operating and capital costs. Indeed Schweppe 
et al. (1988) argue that, since generation is assumed to be dispatched optimally, marginal operating 
costs exceed average variable operating costs and this “excess” can be applied towards capital costs. 
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Equation (3.1) has to meet the following constraints: 
• Energy balance: total production equals total demand plus losses. 
• Generation limits: total demand during hour t cannot exceed the total 
production capacity available at time t. 
• Kirchoff’s Laws: energy flows and losses on a network have to comply with 
physical laws. 
• Line flow limits: energy flows over a particular line cannot exceed specified 
limits of that line (which is the basis of congestion management). 
The hourly spot price, as expressed in equation (3.1), can also be interpreted as 
the sum of different components, each with a physical/economic interpretation, i.e.: 
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It must be noticed that these different components do not necessarily depend on 
each other. Most importantly, network components, contrary to generation ones, 
carry an index k to signify the fact that different consumers are located at different 
parts of the network. That is, spot prices may “spatially” vary due to 1) the differ-
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ences in line losses and 2) the fact that one line can become overloaded (and thus 
prevents moving cheaper power) while the rest of the network does not . Finally, 
“quality of supply” components are like reliability surcharges and thus show positive 
value only when generation or network capacities approach their physical limits.  
Some of the components from (3.2) may be combined together for clarity of 
exposition: 
{ }
{ }
{ }
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As it will be clear later on in this chapter, the system lambda component of the 
hourly spot (or nodal) price is actually the first derivative of generation total fuel and 
maintenance costs with respect to demand in a particular hour t.  
The operating cost components generally represent the largest ones12. While 
such a claim may seem obvious with respect to the marginal value of generation, the 
same cannot be said about the network part of operating costs. Instead, as the 
model’s results will show, the marginal network loss component can be quite 
relevant at times of high demand, even though annual percentage losses are relatively 
small (e.g. 10% of marginal losses vs. 5% of average losses). 
Finally, nodal prices result from a maximization problem of net social welfare 
subject to physical constraints imposed by the transmission system. Indeed, a single 
line constraint will impact power flows on the rest of the network and, subsequently, 
spot prices at all nodes (Hsu, 1997). The welfare objective function is made of three 
key components: consumer benefit, generation fuel and maintenance costs and 
congestion costs (the cost of transmission losses is calculated ex-post because the 
DCLF approximations assumers no losses).  
                                                 
12
 Although when the generation or transmission maximum capacity is being approached, it is the cor-
responding quality of supply components which tend to dominate the hourly spot prices. 
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Because the demand curve plays such a pivotal role in the theory of spot pric-
ing, the next section outlines the key concepts considered in the model. 
3.2.3. Demand modelling approach 
The calculation of consumer surplus is based on the Fundamental Theorem of 
Calculus (Simon & Blume, 1994). The latter states that for a function f(x) which is 
continuous for a ≤ x ≥ b, if we divide the interval [a, b] into smaller and smaller 
subintervals ∆, in the limit we obtain that: 
0 1
lim ( ) ( )
bN
i
i a
f x f x dx
∆→
=
∆ =∑ ∫                   (3.4) 
What this means is that the sum (known as Riemann Sum) of the areas of the 
rectangles with base [xi -∆x, xi] and height f(xi) approximate the area under the graph 
f, represented by the definite integral in the formula above, as shown in the following 
figure: 
 
Figure 8 The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus 
 
The calculation of consumer surplus is simply an application of the above 
mentioned theorem: 
*
* *
0
Consumer Surplus ( ) ( )
q
f q dq q f q= −∫                (3.5) 
Where the p=f(q) is the inverse demand function and q* is the quantity actually 
sold. That is, consumer surplus is equal to the total willingness to pay for the quantity 
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q*(also known as consumer benefit), represented by the integral (=area under the in-
verse demand function), minus the actual expenditure, represented by q*f(q*), al-
ready shown in Figure 6. 
Indeed Peskin (2006) argues that consumer surplus has a long history in 
Economics as a method for estimating the benefits of public projects. The starting 
point for understanding consumer surplus is the consumer demand curve. In the case 
of energy, the latter shows the relationship between the price of energy faced by the 
consumers and the quantity of energy consumed at that price. It must be noted that 
actually the quantity of energy consumed at any point in time depends also on other 
factors, such as the weather or the consumer’s income. It follows that when the focus 
is solely on the quantity-price relationship (i.e. the demand curve), then all other 
factors are considered constant. 
If the market price of energy is below what some consumers would be willing 
to pay (as expressed by the points on the demand curve), then these consumers would 
benefit from a gain in their welfare, represented by the consumer surplus. 
It appears obvious that consumer surplus may depend, other factors being 
fixed, on the shape of the demand curve. If the latter were not linear but instead 
curved towards the origin, the consumer surplus would be smaller. This possibility 
raises the problem of how to estimate the “correct” demand curve. This is why so 
many World Bank studies on electricity estimated their demand curve on actual 
price-quantity observations (e.g. household survey), together with a simple linear 
extrapolation between points (Hobbs, 2001).  
If only two points are observed, then the demand curve may be simply esti-
mated by drawing a straight line between the two points. If it is known that the actual 
demand curve is not linear, then estimating the latter more accurately would require 
more information (e.g. more observations). However previous studies like Barnes, 
Fitzgerald and Peskin (2002) showed that the difference in consumer surplus be-
tween using a linear demand curve and the real non-linear one is rather small. While 
this result may not be applicable to all case studies, it seems fair to expect that a large 
fall in electricity prices will always lead to a large gain in consumer surplus. More-
over, with regards to using a linear or non-linear demand curve, Hobbs (2001) it has 
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been suggested that the use of a affine demand functions is routine in Cournot mod-
els of power markets and has the distinct advantage of resulting in linear rather than  
non-linear complementarity problems (NCPs), thus facilitating the analysis and com-
putation. Indeed, non-linear demand functions can be used, and solutions can be 
computed using NCP solvers; but the analysis is made more complicated without 
yielding significantly more insights (Metzler, Hobbs, & Pang, 2003). For these rea-
sons, a linear demand function, to be specified later, has been adopted in the model. 
Therefore the demand curve for electricity is approximated by a linear demand 
function, based on 1) actual reference demands for each node, 2) a reference price, 
assumed identical at all nodes and 3) an assumed value of demand elasticity at the 
reference point (Dietrich et al., 2005). In particular such demand curves may be 
obtained with few mathematical steps. First, following the original methodology 
employed by Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen (2008), a general linear inverse 
demand function is assumed: 
( )p d a bd= +                                                                                                (3.6) 
Or 
1( ) ad p p
b b
= − +                                                                                           (3.7) 
Where 
a= intercept or prohibitive price; 
b=negative slope. 
By definition, demand elasticity has to be equal to: 
d p
p d
δ
ε δ=                                                                                                        (3.8) 
And from (3.7)  
1 p
b d
ε =                                                                                                           (3.9) 
Slope b and intercept a can then be calculated at a reference point where 
demand, price and elasticity are assumed as given: 
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1ref
ref
pb
d ε
=                                                                                                    (3.10) 
ref refa p bd= −                                                                                             (3.11) 
After a few simplifications, the result is an inverse demand function by node n 
which actually represents the nodal price for the optimal demand d*: 
*
1
ref
ref n n
n n ref
n
p d
p p
dε
 
= + − 
 
                                                                           (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) clearly indicates that nodal price is a function of optimal nodal 
demand, with reference price, reference demand and elasticity as fixed parameters. 
All other calculations for the demand side in the model follow from this equation. 
For every node, the consumer benefit is calculated as the area below such inverse 
demand curve, i.e. by integrating the latter: 
( )
*
2
* *
0
1 1 1( ) 1
2
nd ref
ref n
n n n n n n ref
n n n
pCB p d dd p d d
dε ε
    
= = − +   
    
∑ ∑∫                   (3.13) 
Similarly consumer surplus is calculated as: 
( ) *1
2 n n
CS a p d= −                                                                                        (3.14) 
3.2.4. Supply modelling approach 
It is well known in Power System Economics that the marginal cost (or MC) 
function of any one generator is roughly horizontal, except taking an infinite upward 
leap when it reaches full output, making it a discontinuous supply curve (Stoft, 
2002). Moreover a node with multiple generators would have a so called step-wise 
cost function, as shown in Figure 9: this implies that small changes in prices would 
often have no effect on the pattern of generation; but, also that a change would 
occasionally have a discontinuous impact as one generator become cheaper than 
another.  
Figure 10 shows the typical supply curve at a node with several generation 
technologies.   
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Figure 9 An example of a step-wise supply function 
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Figure 10 An example of a typical supply curve in the electricity market 
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It must be pointed out that Green (2007) uses a linear marginal cost function to 
represent producers in its nodal pricing model. However, Neuhoff et al.(2005), after 
comparing different cost function approximations in power market simulations mod-
els, concludes that for competitive – i.e. not strategic – markets, the results for linear 
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and step-functions are surprisingly similar. Therefore this PhD’s model, since it as-
sumes perfect competitive markets, adopts a typical step-wise supply function for 
describing generators’ costs. This implies that supply side calculations in the model 
are based on the following equations: 
, , ,n k n k n ktc mc g=                                                                                             (3.15) 
( ), , ,n k n n k n kp mc gpi = −                                                                                  (3.16) 
Where, at any one particular time 
tcn,k= total cost of production of generator k at node n; 
mcn,k = constant marginal cost of generator k at node n; 
gn,k = level of production of generator k at node n; 
,n kpi = profit of generator k at node n; 
pn = market price for all generators at node n; 
 
3.2.5. DC Load Flow approach 
The power flows over a given line in a network and the losses in that line are 
determined by the generation and loads at ALL nodes, not just the nodes at either end 
of the line (Christie et al., 2000). Such complexity is well represented by the two 
Kirchoff’s laws, which govern power flows (Stoft 2002):  
• The current flow into any node in a circuit equals the current flow out (i.e. 
charges cannot be destroyed). 
• The voltage drops around any loop sum to zero 
There are two types of current: direct current (DC) and alternating current 
(AC). DC flows in only one direction and has a voltage which is quite constant; AC 
is more complex but its voltage can be easily changed, which is a huge advantage for 
transporting electricity over long distances. Furthermore AC may be seen as a 
sequence of DC power flows that alternates directions. And because power is equal 
to voltage difference times current, when both voltage and current reverse – i.e. both 
with negative sign – power still flows from generator to load. Indeed most of the 
basic properties of AC power flows addressed by market design can be understood 
by adopting a DC model.  
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Conventionally power flows are divided into two components: real power, 
which only flows from generators to load and delivers energy; reactive power, which 
is present only in AC and goes back and forth in equal amounts but supplies no 
energy. Reactive power is relevant from a costing perspective because it contributes 
to system losses by causing real currents. But reactive power may also contribute to 
congestion: since the primary source of heat is the friction of current in the wires, 
thermal limits, which define when transmission lines are congested, depend on both 
real and reactive power.  
Maximum flows of real power may be defined also in terms of stability limits. 
But, unlike thermal limits which depend on the thickness of the wires, stability limits 
depend on their length: the longer the line, the lower the limit. As a rule of thumb, 
the key power flow limits for short transmission lines tend to be thermal ones while 
those for long lines tend to be stability limits. Furthermore power flows down a 
transmission line because of voltage difference (equivalent to pressure in water): in a 
DC line this means a higher voltage at the generation end and a lower voltage at the 
load end; in an AC line this means the voltage at the load is out of phase with the 
voltage at the generator, i.e. power flows are driven by a phase difference – measured 
by the phase angle – between two voltages at different locations. 
Since most high voltage transmission lines rely on three-phase AC power sys-
tems (with few exceptions such as sub-sea DC links), an AC load flow model 
(ACLF) model would be ideal to calculate the real and reactive powers flowing 
through the transmission lines for some specified nodal conditions. An ACLF relies 
on four types of variables: real powers, reactive powers, voltage magnitude and volt-
age angles. Moreover, the physical nature of an electric system is such that there is a 
strong coupling between real power and voltage angle as well as between reactive 
power and voltage magnitude with much weaker coupling in the other cases. The 
network’s structure and parameters lead to a set of 2N -1 (where N is the number of 
nodes) simultaneous nonlinear equations, which is quite complex to solve. In order to 
simplify this problem, an approximation, called DC load flow (DCLF) model, is of-
ten used instead of the more accurate AC model. Such approximation produces a lin-
ear set of equations coupling real power to voltage angle, i.e. only one half of the de-
coupled ACLF. Indeed DCLF models, which focuses on real power flows only, are 
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often used for economic analysis of electricity networks with respect to physical con-
straints (Blumsack, Lave, & Ilic' Marija, 2007). 
Therefore a standard DCLF model, as suggested in the standard theory of spot 
pricing of electricity, is used in this PhD to simulate operations on the British grid13. 
DCLF equations rely upon a number of approximations which would make them 
inadequate for detailed system planning because they do not provide any information 
on voltage magnitudes or MVA flows (Wood & Wollenberg, 1996). However it must 
be pointed out that the DCLF approach is considered suitable for illustrating the 
impact of unit transmission charges, which is why it is currently used by NGC for 
calculating its transmission charges (Ault, Elders, & Green, 2007).  
The four main DCLF equations, which make up the relevant model, help to 
approximate the interactions between generation and demand at each point on the 
network and also the power flows on each line. These equations, which are 
thoroughly explained in Appendix D of Schweppe et al. (1988) , are the following: 
( ) 11 1TFS R A A R A −− −=  (shift factor matrix)14                                (3.17) 
Fz S y=    (transmission line flows)                             (3.18) 
Tl z Rz=    (transmission losses)              (3.19) 
1
0
N
j
j
y l
=
− =∑    (energy balance constraint)             (3.20) 
Where, in a network with N nodes connected by L lines, 
R= NxN diagonal matrix, which contains the impedance of line i on its 
diagonal (iith element) and zeros elsewhere; 
                                                 
13
 Before choosing a DCLF model, an ACLF model was constructed by following the detailed meth-
odology provided in Rau (2003). However, after comparing the results between the two types of mod-
els, it was decided that the limited further information (e.g. about reactive power) provided by the 
ACLF model was not sufficiently meaningful in terms of revealing congestion patterns to justify the 
much greater complexity (e.g. adding reactive power balance equations) that this approach would 
bring to the model. 
14
 A numerical example for the shift factor matrix SF and its components is provided in Appendix 1. 
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A= Nx(N-1) non-singular modified network incidence matrix15 and shows 
which nodes are connected to which line and (AT is its transpose);  
z = L-vector of power flows iz  for each line i; 
y = is the vector containing N-116 net power injections yj (=generation – 
demand) at node j. 
The elements of the shift factor matrix (also known as transfer admittance ma-
trix) are the power transfer distribution factor or PTDFs. It must be remembered that 
due to physics laws, the lower the impedance of one line relative to the other lines, 
the greater the power flow across that line. PTDFs specify how net injections from 
any node split among different lines on the network, as shown in equation (3.18). To-
tal transmission losses on the grid are calculated in (3.19) as a quadratic function of 
power flows. Finally the “energy balance constraint” equation indicates that all N net 
injections must be equal to the total amount of losses on the network at any time. 
3.2.6. Final structure of the model 
The previous sections have set out the main intuitions and theoretical 
assumptions behind this PhD’s model. This paragraph summarizes the main 
components of the model.  
The model is based on a bottom-up approach and combines concepts from both 
economics and electrical engineering. Its objective function is the maximization of 
social welfare, subject to three types of constraints: energy balance, maximum indi-
vidual generation and maximum power flows. Demand and supply are represented at 
each node by a linear inverse function (equation (3.12)) and stepwise function (equa-
tion (3.15)) respectively. Power flows and transmission losses are the direct result of 
a DCLF model. Following the methodology developed by Green (2007), in analytical 
terms the model is structured as follows: 
*
,
,
0
max ( )
nd
n n n n kd g
n n k
p d dd tc−∑ ∑∑∫                                                                 (3.21) 
                                                 
15
 This matrix is modified with respect to original network incidence matrix, which is a singular NxN 
one, by eliminating the column corresponding to a reference bus (also known as swing bus). 
16
 The vector y  is N-1-dimensioned instead of N because one node is not modelled due to the energy 
balance constraint. 
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Subject to 
,n k n
n k n
g d l= +∑∑ ∑                             (energy balance )                          (3.22)                                                               
max
, ,n k n kg g≤                   for any n, k        (max individual generation)         (3.23)                                                       
max
i iz z≤                       for each line i    (max power flow)                         (3.24)                                                   
Where, at any one particular time, 
*
nd = optimal demand at node n; 
max
,n kg = maximum capacity for generator k at node n; 
max
iz = maximum capacity for flows on transmission line i; 
Figure 11 simply describes the same problem from a graphical point of view: 
that is, maximize total consumer benefit minus total cost of generation, which is 
identical to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus. As previously an-
ticipated consumer’s benefit is represented by the area below the inverse demand 
function and therefore is calculated by integrating on the inverse demand function 
curve from zero to the optimal demand point: ∑ ∫
n
d
nn
n
dddp
*
0
)( . Equation (3.22) de-
rives from the fact that, as electricity cannot be stored, at any one time total genera-
tion must be equal to total consumption plus losses, in order to avoid changes in sys-
tem frequency. Equation (3.23) states that every generator cannot produce above its 
own capacity while equation (3.24) says that power flows on a line can never be 
greater in magnitude than the line’s thermal limit. The flows depend on the levels of 
generation and demand at each node and they are derived from a DC Load Flow 
Model.  
This problem is solved with LMP, re-dispatching when required by 
transmission constraints, and for different levels of demand and of generation 
availabilities. The result of this non-linear optimization problem is that the first-best 
price of electricity at each node equals the marginal cost of providing electricity at 
that node: this implies that the price of electricity must take into account, besides the 
cost of generation, also the cost caused by transmission constraints and transmission 
losses. 
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Figure 11 Calculation of social welfare (Dietrich et al., 2005)  
 
 
In analytical terms this may be translated into the following equation: 
1 in e i
in n
zlp
d d
µ µ  ∂∂= + + ∂ ∂ 
∑        (market clearing price)                         (3.25)                          
Where, at any one particular time 
eµ = Lagrange multiplier (or shadow price) of the energy balance constraint (= the 
system lambda in equation 3.3); 
iµ = Lagrange multiplier (or shadow price) of the flow constraint for line i; 
The multiplier eµ  may be interpreted as the marginal cost of generation at the 
“swing” or “reference” bus17, i.e. the location of the marginal generator which can 
provide an extra unit of electricity in a system without losses or constraints. The 
marginal generator is the producer which is selected by the demand on the merit or-
                                                 
17
 Calculations at all buses are made relative to flow from the bus in question to the “reference” bus. 
However the choice of the latter is irrelevant because all economic calculations involve a subtraction 
that causes the effect of the choice to cancel out. 
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der/supply curve. The cost of this marginal generator determines the market clearing 
price for that particular moment. In a real power system though there will be both 
transmission losses and constraints, which contribute to the final cost of delivered 
electricity. In a nodal pricing system such costs are represented by spatial differentia-
tion of prices at various nodes.  
In (3.25),  1
n
l
d
 ∂
+ ∂ 
 reflects incremental share of network losses which arise 
from transporting active power to node n. If the demand at node n is 1MW, more or 
less of 1MW will have to be produced depending on whether demand at node n leads 
to an increase or a decrease in flows. Most importantly, it must be noticed that the 
marginal network loss component can be quite important at times of high demand 
even if annual percentage losses are relatively small (Schweppe et al., 1988). Indeed, 
one of the key DCLF equations, Tl z Rz= , clearly indicated that total losses l are 
proportional to the square of power flows. This also means that average losses are 
proportional to power flows and thus marginal losses, 
kd
l
∂
∂
, are twice the average 
losses. For instance, if the average loss is 2.5% of the load, then the marginal loss is 
5%. Therefore, if the marginal cost of production at a generation node is £30/MWh, 
then the efficient price at the demand node should be £31.5/MWh (provided that the 
demand at that node leads to an increase in losses). 
Instead ii
i n
z
d
µ ∂
∂∑
 represents congestion costs, i.e. the proportional costs due to 
violation of line flow limits for delivering power to node n. Power flows zi between 
two nodes j and k are a direct result of the demand and generation across the network 
and they have to be lower in magnitude than the physical capacity limit of a line i. If 
constraint (3.24) is not binding, then network is unrestricted and prices are all equal 
to eµ . If congestion occurs generation and demand have to be shifted, e.g. a more ex-
pensive power plant at node k has to start-up while a cheaper one at node j has to 
lower output to reduce the power flow on line i. Thus the nodal price will differ from 
eµ  in an unrestricted network to reflect the scarcity price of transmission. Green 
(2007) explains this effect through a simple two-node network example : 
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Figure 12 A two-node example of congestion 
 
 
 
In Figure 12, if the line between generator G1, which is cheaper, and demand D 
is operating at its maximum capacity, then any further demand will have to be met by 
the more expensive generator G2 at the same node. This also means the shadow price 
of this constraint is £13/MWh. This means that minimum cost is achieved only when 
marginal cost is equal to market price, making the latter the economically efficient 
price. If market price does not reflect marginal cost, this means that the market has 
failed to produce efficient prices. That is, market price should reflect also network 
externalities, i.e. losses and congestion. 
Overall price equation (3.25), which may be obtained by solving this optimiza-
tion problem, is just a way of decomposing nodal prices into the cost of losses and 
the cost of the constraint. While nodal pricing allows for spatially differentiated 
prices, under so-called uniform pricing (UNI), the first line restriction can define the 
price for the whole system, while losses are generally socialized with distorting tar-
iffs (as indicated in Table 1).  
There are several methods for managing congestion which are based on uni-
form pricing, but probably countertrading – currently adopted in the British electric-
ity market – is the most common one among liberalized electricity markets (CESI, 
2003). When power flow on a line becomes congested, the system operator (e.g. 
NGC) can employ counter trading to increase the line trading capability. In other 
words, the system operator requests the generators to regulate down a certain amount 
of generation on the surplus side of the congested line, for which they are paid. Simi-
larly, generators on the shortfall side are paid to regulate generation up the same 
amount. While normal generation is paid for at the national price, constrained-on 
generation is paid its cost (higher than the national price). Generation which is con-
strained-off is also sold back to the generator at cost (it must be sold back, since it 
 
G1 (£20/MWh) 
 G2 (£33/MWh) 
 Demand    
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had already been “paid for”). If the producer had been bidding its marginal cost, it 
would neither gain nor lose from this transaction. 
The amount of power, resulting from counter-trading, will flow in opposite 
direction with regards to the power the market players wish to transmit, making an 
extra transmission capacity available in the direction of congestion. In order to 
identify the lowest-priced counter trading parties, the system operator usually refers 
to a merit order built on the basis of the bids submitted by generators on the real time 
balancing market (e.g. the balancing mechanism in Great Britain) or in the day-ahead 
energy market. This mechanism sends no locational signals to the market (except to 
the few generators directly involved in the regulation), since counter trading costs 
incurred by the transmission company are usually “socialized” through distorting 
tariffs (e.g. balancing use of system charges in the British market). 
With regards to this PhD, uniform pricing is modelled by simply adding a 
further constraint to the LMP model - equations 3.21-24 -, as suggested in Weigt et 
al. (2009):  
n m
p p=                 for any m≠n (uniform price)                           (3.26)                                         
Such constraint simply means that nodal prices have to be identical (i.e. 
“uniform”) at all nodes. It must be said that this particular approach does not fully 
represent a typical power system based on uniform pricing and counter-treading, like 
the British one. And that is because this type of one-stage model optimizes demand 
and production while simultaneously taking all network constraints into account. In 
an actual power market with uniform pricing,  the optimization is more of a two-
stage process: in the first one the market is cleared without taking constraints into 
account; in the second one, demand is fixed and constraints are managed through 
cost-based re-dispatch.  
Moreover the system operator tends to solve constraints by seeking a “local” 
optimum rather than a “global” (i.e. in the whole network) one. The result is that the 
one-stage UNI model is “cleverer” and more efficient, which leads to a higher wel-
fare than it would be otherwise. However it is believed that such model is still an ac-
ceptable approximation of the real world. Indeed a two-stage UNI model had been 
developed for this PhD but it had to be abandoned in favour of the one-stage one be-
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cause the former led to unfeasible problems in several scenarios (e.g. those with high 
wind factors).  
Finally Figure 13 summarizes the entire modelling process planned for this 
PhD. 
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Figure 13 Modelling spatial pricing and renewables. 
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3.3. HOW CAN THIS PROBLEM BE MODELLED IN PRACTICE? 
The previous section has outlined how the model has been developed from a 
theoretical perspective. This section sets out how the model has been developed in 
practice, including how some of the key features of the British electricity market 
(e.g. renewable obligation) have been taken into account.  
3.3.1. The initial model  
Modelling an entire power system like the British one is a complex challenge 
which requires handling massive amounts of data. Therefore, it appears sensible to 
begin by building a smaller model based on a virtual system, before developing a 
much bigger one for the GB market. 
As previously mentioned, this PhD’s model is based on a bottom-up approach. 
Furthermore, following (Rau, 2003) several optimization models have been 
developed in sequence, adding more complexities at every stage. This process 
continued until the model appeared sufficiently robust to deal with the optimization 
problem of this PhD as well as with the complexities of a real system. Each model 
has been developed in Microsoft Excel and solved with its embedded Solver.   
The initial dispatch model is represented by the simplest linear problem, with 
eleven generators located at four buses, marginal costs by generator, a fixed system 
demand and no network. Its objective is clearly the minimization of the total cost of 
dispatch, subject to the constraint that total production must match total demand. 
Then the following complexities have been added to create increasingly more 
“sophisticated” models: 
• Demand at every node with corresponding bid prices. The objective is now 
social welfare maximization. Decision variables are both demand and supply 
quantities. The shadow price (or Lagrange multiplier) of the energy balance 
constraint is the market clearing price, i.e. the intersection between demand 
and supply curve. 
• More nodes and more generators.  
• A meshed network but no binding limits on power flows. The shift factor ma-
trix is introduced for calculating power flows; however, because there are no 
transmission constraints the locational marginal price (LMP) is the same at all 
nodes and is equal to the cost of dispatching the marginal generator (= i.e. the 
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shadow price of the energy balance constraint). This effectively becomes an 
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem as the cost associated with generation at 
each node is specified and the optimization process is asked to pick necessary 
injections to meet the demand at minimum cost (i.e. optimal dispatch). In that 
sense, the optimization program (e.g. Solver) dispatches different generators 
just as a system operator would do. In another sense, the problem formulation 
is similar to that of an auction or a dispatch based on bids. 
• Binding limits on some power flows. There are non-zero shadow prices, 
associated with those lines which are congested. Because of this binding 
constraint, total generation costs go up (and welfare goes down) with respect 
to the previous model with no transmission constraints. This is because 
generators have to be re-dispatched, reducing the output from cheaper 
generators and dispatching more expensive ones to take transmission limits 
into account. Thus market prices vary by node. LMPs may be calculated by 
adding “reduced costs” from Excel’s sensitivity report to producers’ marginal 
costs (or subtracting them from consumers’ bids). 
• Transmission losses. They are added to the energy balance constraint. The 
optimization problem is now non-linear and non-convex and thus more 
difficult to solve. There is now a “loop” between the main dispatch model 
and a separate spreadsheet where losses, which depend upon optimal power 
flows ( Tl z Rz= ), are calculated. 
• Price restriction. Prices must be the same at every node. This added constraint 
is necessary to move from an LMP model to a UNI one. 
• Nonlinear marginal cost (MC) function. The cost of production is given by 
the area under the MC function and so it is calculated by integrating this 
function while using the choice variables. The total sum of these costs of 
production gives the cost of dispatch. Without considering constraints for 
transmission and minimum output, all generators operate in a way that MC is 
equal to system lambda, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
energy balance constraint. 
After extensively testing the latest version of this “virtual” model, it became 
apparent that the latter was sufficiently robust to move to the final stage of the 
bottom-up approach. That is, the model had to undergo the final changes (e.g. 
introduce the demand function) and extensions (e.g. number of nodes) in order to be 
able to simulate the GB market.    
3.3.2. The optimization package 
It was clear early on that Excel’s in built Solver would be insufficiently power-
ful to solve the full GB problem. There are several optimization packages on the 
market which may be suitable for solving this type of problem. For instance 
Leuthold, Weigt & von Hirschhausen  (2008) uses GAMS (General Algebraic 
Modelling System) while Neuhoff et al. (2008) adopts Xpress linear programme 
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solver from Dash. However, in the end the Premium Solve Platform seemed a sensi-
ble choice for the following reasons: 
• This model has been developed primarily in Microsoft Excel. 
• This model follows the bottom-up methodology of Rau (2003), which relies 
on spreadsheets only. 
• The software has been designed by Frontline System, which is the same 
company that developed Solver in Microsoft Excel.   
• The software is a fully compatible upgrade for the Solver bundled with 
Microsoft Excel   
With regards to its main features, Premium Solver Platform is Frontline’s most 
powerful product for conventional optimization. It includes the PSI (Polymorphic 
Spreadsheet Interpreter. The PSI technology turned out very useful because it can 
diagnose a model as a linear programming, quadratic programming, smooth 
nonlinear, or non-smooth optimization model, and automatically select Solver 
engines suitable for the model. It can also pinpoint formulas that make a model 
nonlinear or non-smooth.  Not surprisingly, this model was diagnosed as smooth, 
non-linear and non-convex. 
Moreover, Premium Solver Platform comes with five built-in Solvers 
(LP/Quadratic, SOCP Barrier, GRG Nonlinear, Interval Global, and Evolutionary), 
and it supports plug-in large-scale Solver Engines. After testing all engines (suitable 
for this optimization problem), two solution methods seemed to yield the best results 
in terms of objective values and computational time: the Generalized Reduced 
Gradient (GRG) method, which may be seen as a non-linear extension of the 
Simplex method used in linear programming and the Sequential Quadratic 
Programming (SQP) method. In the end the GRG one was chosen.   
3.3.3. Characteristics of the British electricity market 
Every electricity market presents several features which differ from those of 
other markets. For instance, Germany and the UK have taken different policy direc-
tions in promoting renewable energy sources: Germany developed a feed-in tariff 
scheme and the UK initially tendered for projects and then moved to a Tradable 
Green Certificate scheme (Butler & Neuhoff, 2008). Some of these differences 
should be dealt with by a model which tries to simulate an electricity market with 
reasonable accuracy. Therefore this paragraph introduces some of these features for 
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the GB market – especially in the area of environmental policy – and briefly explains 
how they have been addressed in the model. 
EU Emission Trading Scheme. This is the EU-wide greenhouse gas 
emissions trading scheme, introduced initially in 2005 but with the most recent Phase 
starting in 2008, under which governments must set emission limits for all large 
emitters of carbon dioxide in their country. This policy is taken into account in the 
model by adding the cost of carbon (£/MWh) to generators’ variable costs. More 
details are provided in a later section on cost modelling. 
Large Combustion Plant Directive. This is a European Union Directive 
which aims to reduce emissions of sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen and particulate 
matter from large combustion plants. GB power plants must either comply with the 
LCPD through installing emission abatement equipment or 'opt-out' of the directive. 
An existing plant that chooses to 'opt-out' is restricted in its operation and must close 
by the end of 2015. Choosing which plants will have retired by 2015 has a major 
impact on the model as it may seriously affect load factors (→ revenues) of 
remaining plants and reserve margins levels (→ scarcity pricing effects). The final 
decision on which oil- and coal-fired plant to retire from the model has been based 
on several sources of information, including NGC (2009a) and (2009d). One 
example of this type of information is shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 14 Indicative LCPD coal opt-out plant closing dates (NGC, 2009d) 
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Renewable target. The Renewables Obligation (RO) places an obligation on 
electricity suppliers to source an increasing portion of the electricity they sell from 
renewable sources. In April 2009 this obligation changed from a percentage of a 
supplier's sales to an obligation to submit a number of Renewables Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs) per MWh of a supplier's sales (Ofgem, 2009b). A banded RO 
was introduced so that more expensive renewable technologies (e.g. off-shore wind) 
may receive more than just one ROC per MWh. This implies that one ROC will not 
necessarily be equivalent to one MWh of renewable electricity. In Great Britain the 
obligation started at 3% of electricity supplied in 2002-2003. The new banded RO is 
9.7 ROCs per 100 MWh in 2009-2010, reaches 15.4 ROCs per 100 MWh in 2015-
2016 and remains at this level until 2026-2027.  
The RO is not explicitly modelled in this PhD because the model does not 
include small and medium renewable generators connected to the distribution 
system.  Furthermore, not all hydro schemes in the model are eligible for ROCs. 
Therefore no precise assessment of the modelled system’s compliance in meeting the 
RO in 2015 is possible. However, it must be noted that, with regards to wind farms, 
the model includes all large plants (directly connected or embedded), and medium 
and small plants, which are directly connected to the GB Transmission System. 
Because wind is due to provide the largest amount of renewable electricity in the 
coming years (as shown in Figure 15), it is believed that the model’s results are still 
meaningful in terms of progress towards a 2015 (or even the EU 2020) target. 
Figure 15 Operational wind capacity in the highly feasible scenario (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2009) 
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3.3.4. Network modelling 
The GB 400kV, 275kV and 132kV transmission system consists of hundreds 
of nodes and lines. Due to computational and time constraints, it would not be 
possible for this PhD to model the network at that level of detail. Indeed even NGC, 
for the purpose of illustrating system performance, the need for transmission 
reinforcement and for describing opportunities, has divided the system into 17 
“boundaries” (11 for England & Wales and 6 for Scotland), as shown in both Figure 
16 and Table 3. Each boundary generally coincides with a group of transmission 
lines which are heavily loaded and might be constrained under some conditions (e.g. 
very cold weather). The areas of the system described by and/or encompassed by the 
17 Seven Year Statement (SYS) boundaries are referred to as the SYS Study Zones. 
It would appear sensible to try and adopt the same 17 boundaries for this PhD 
model. Indeed Green (2007) developed a model for England & Wales in 1996 which 
was based upon these zones. However it was not feasible to adopt the same type of 
network for this PhD because it was not possible to find all the necessary data, 
specifically the admittance and impedance values required by DCLF calculations. 
Therefore, in the end the choice fell on a completely different option: a radial, 
rather than meshed18, network with 16 nodes connected by 15 lines. There were 
several reasons for choosing this particular type of network (shown in Figure 16):  
• It is specifically designed to be applied to the GB power system in the 
Department of Electrical Engineering at Imperial College London. 
• All network inputs (e.g. admittance and topology) required by the DCLF 
model are available. 
• It has already been used in several publications addressing congestion and 
wind issues, such as Strbac et al (2007). 
Table 4 describes the network topology in details, i.e. how each node is con-
nected by each line and directions in power flows. Table 5 shows the mapping for 
generation between the 16 node network and NGC’s, which is necessary to correctly 
                                                 
18
 In a radial network power flows only in one direction (e.g. north to south) rather than “everywhere” 
like in a meshed one. This implies that the admittance value is equal to “1” on every line. 
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allocate generation capacities. And Table 6 indicates (the assumption) of how system 
demand is distributed across the 16 nodes at any one time. 
 
Figure 16 A map of GB transmission system in 2009 (NGC, 2009a) 
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Table 3 NGC SYS boundaries (NGC, 2009a) 
Boundary Number Boundary Name Licensee
 B1  North West Export  SHETL
 B2  North-South  SHETL
 B3  Sloy Export  SHETL
 B4  SHETL-SPT  SHETL/SPT
 B5  North-South  SPT
 B6  SPT-NGET (Cheviot)  SPT/NGET
 B7  Upper North-North  NGET
 B8  North to Midlands  NGET
 B9  Midlands to South  NGET
 B10  South Coast  NGET
 B11  North East & Yorkshire  NGET
 B12  South & South West  NGET
 B13  South West  NGET
 B14  London  NGET
 B15  Thames Estuary  NGET
 B16  North East Trent & Yorkshire  NGET
 B17  West Midlands  NGET
 
 
Figure 17 A 16-node network for the GB system 
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Table 4 16-node network topology 
Boundary From Node To Node From Node To Node
TB1 NW-SHETL N-SHETL 1 2
TB2 N-SHETL S-SHETL 2 4
TB3 SLOY S-SHETL 3 4
TB4 S-SHETL N-SPTL 4 5
TB5 N-SPTL S-SPTL 5 6
TB6 S-SPTL UN-E&W 6 7
TB7 UN-E&W N-E&W 7 10
TB8 NW-E&W N-E&W 8 10
TB9 NE-E&W N-E&W 9 10
TB10 N-E&W M-E&W 10 13
TB11 MW-E&W M-E&W 11 13
TB12 ME-E&W M-E&W 12 13
TB13 M-E&W S-E&W 13 16
TB14 SW-E&W S-E&W 14 16
TB15 SE-E&W S-E&W 15 16
 
 
Table 5 Node mapping for generation 
Nodes NGC SYS Study Zones
1 1
2 2
3 4
4 3
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 9
9 8,10
10 No generation
11 11
12 12
13 No generation
14 13,17
15 15
16 14,16
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Table 6 Node mapping for demand 
Nodes Demand distribution factors
1 0.91%
2 0.87%
3 0.00%
4 1.06%
5 1.83%
6 4.90%
7 5.26%
8 12.38%
9 9.81%
10 0.00%
11 13.00%
12 1.21%
13 0.00%
14 19.76%
15 12.76%
16 16.26%
Total 100.00%
 
 
Unfortunately there is no reliable information on the mapping between this 
network’s 15 lines and NGC’s 17 boundaries. Because of this problem, the 15 lines’ 
maximum transmission capacities had to be calculated with the help of a separate 
model. In particular the main inputs and parameters (e.g. generation capacities, 
marginal costs, etc.) of this PhD were inserted into a Dynamic Transmission 
Investment Model (DTIM). The latter, developed in the Department of Electrical 
Engineering at Imperial College London, is based on a multi-year Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) and it is formulated as a linear programming problem that 
minimizes the Present Value (PV) of the cost of investment plus the cost of 
constraints in a system with significant penetration of wind generation (Moreno et 
al., 2009). However, it must be pointed out that for those lines where the mapping 
with NGC’s boundaries was clear (i.e. lines 1-6), NGC’s estimated capacities for 
2015 were chosen instead. The resulting transmission capacities are presented in the 
following table.  
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Table 7 Transmission capacities for 2015 
 
Also, because this is a loss-less model, there is no information on lines’ imped-
ance. This implies that transmission losses for 2015 could not be calculated in a “tra-
ditional” way, i.e. by substituting impedance and power flow values into Tl z Rz=  
(equation (3.19)). Instead, the following “backward” calculation had to be adopted: 
• Identify from (NGC, 2009a) an estimate for total losses l at system peak 
demand in 2015. 
• Run the optimization model with the same system peak demand but without 
losses in order to determine the vector of power flows z. 
• Substitute l and z into Tl z Rz=  and calculate the impedance matrix R. 
• Use this R to calculate losses in the “traditional” way in all other demand 
scenarios. 
Because of these approximations on impedance values, the model tends to 
underestimate total transmission losses. 
3.3.5. Electricity demand modelling 
Because the model is looking at the GB power system in 2015, the first priority 
was to estimate hourly (or half-hourly) demand for that particular year. To this pur-
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pose NGC’s most recent estimated system (winter) peak demand on the GB Trans-
mission System for the Average Cold Spell (ACS)19 condition had to be identified, 
i.e. around 64GW (NGC, 2009a). Because transmission losses are calculated in the 
model, the system peak demand had to be reduced by NGC’s estimated losses for 
2015, so that the final value was around 62GW. The latter was then multiplied by a 
series of half-hourly profiles (in %) in order to obtain 17,520 half-hourly demand 
values (in GWh) for the whole 2015.  
For modelling purposes, demand is either measured on a half-hourly (or 
hourly) chronological basis resulting in half-hourly market prices or segmented into 
several load duration curves resulting in one market price per segment. Both methods 
have advantages and disadvantages:  
• Load duration curves (LDCs) allow for dynamic optimization over extended 
periods of time but do not capture differences in hourly market prices since 
they produce only one price per segment (see Figure 18).   
• Chronological hourly load creates a very large, time consuming problem to 
solve for when a “look ahead” feature is incorporated, making long term 
optimization difficult without several iterations, although the variation in 
hourly prices is captured (see Figure 19). 
Due to computational and time constraints, the first approach was chosen. 
Actual half-hourly data for a particular power system is used to define the 
corresponding load shape, from which a load duration curve is built. The latter is an 
ordering of loads by hour, from the highest load to the lowest load occurring over the 
full duration of the period captured by each of the different load seasons modelled 
(Jing-Yuan & Smeers, 1999). This new yearly curve is then divided into a 
corresponding number of seasons (e.g. 4 seasons).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Annual Average Cold Spell Conditions are a particular combination of weather elements which 
gives rise to a level of peak demand within a financial year which has a 50% chance of being ex-
ceeded as a result of weather variation alone. 
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Figure 18 Load duration curve for the GB system in 2015 
 
 
Figure 19 Chronological curve for the GB system in 2015 
 
Thus, each season has a unique curve representing the demand for energy in 
that period. A season could be several months or a single month. Seasonal LDCs 
rather than annual LDCs are used to capture differences in the level and patterns of 
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customer demands for electricity and to capture seasonal differences in resource 
availability or operating characteristics: e.g. because of maintenance scheduling for 
individual generating units, the capacity and utilization of supply resources can vary 
significantly between seasons.  
Finally, each of these seasonal curves is then divided into a number of blocks 
of hours or segments (e.g. 10 segments per season). The segment definition 
determines the way in which the seasonal load shape will be “cut” into peak and off-
peak hours. This means that LDCs are represented by a discrete number of horizontal 
(or vertical) segments, as illustrated in Figure 18. The top segment generally contains 
less than 1% of the hours in the season or period. The bottom segment includes the 
lowest load hours and contains the load level equal to the minimum system load. 
Clearly a greater number of segments provides a more detailed depiction of loads to 
the model's dispatch algorithm, but also increases the computational time of the 
model. 
Overall in order to specify the final demand inputs for the model, the following 
methodology was followed: 
• Divide yearly data into a number of seasons; 
• Divide each set of seasonal data in a number of blocks of hours; 
• Distribute demand values for all block of hours among the 16 nodes.    
First of all, it was decided to divide the 17,520 half-hourly values into two 
seasons, summer and winter. Following the official summer dates for 2015 led to 
durations of 211 (=10,128 half-hours) and 154 days (=7,392) for summer and winter 
respectively.  
Also, because demand behaviour is bound to be one of the most important 
variable inputs of the model, further analysis on demand data has been carried out 
and the main results are presented herewith. LDCs are particularly useful to 
generators because they use this type of information to estimate the amount of hours 
they may able to run and thus the amount of revenue they may be able to make. For 
instance, Figure 20 and 21 indicate that summer demand is at almost 40GW for 50% 
of the time while in winter this level of demand is achieved for at least 70% of the 
time.  
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Figures 22-24 are three-dimensional representations of demand behaviour for 
yearly, summer and winter data respectively. The x-axis shows how load 
requirements vary throughout the year, while the z-axis indicates the consumer 
behaviour throughout the day, which is divided into 48 half-hours or periods, starting 
from midnight. Figure 22 is particularly useful to highlight the typical seasonality 
pattern in the northern hemisphere, i.e. with higher demand levels due to lower 
average temperatures in winter months. Seasonality is also evident in Figure 23 and 
24 by observing, for instance, that the red area, indicating on-peak demand, is much 
larger in winter than in summer months. 
Moreover, Figures 25-27 present results in terms of mean and standard 
deviation during the 48 periods. As expected, all three graphs show that average 
demand is low at night and starts to grow at around period 15, i.e. before 8 a.m. It is 
interesting to notice that summer months display a steeper rise in demand early in the 
morning than winter. This is probably due to the fact that heat and lighting 
requirements are much lower at night and in the early morning during the summer 
but then industrial activities (and air conditioners) start to kick in as the working day 
starts. Figure 27 also shows that winter peak demand is achieved on average at 
around 8pm rather than at lunchtime like in summer. This is due to higher heat 
requirements in winter, lighting pickup and domestic cooking at the end of the 
working day in winter. In summer business electricity use dominates. 
Finally, information on average standard deviations in Figures 25-27 provide 
some insights into demand’s volatility during the day. Figure 25 in particular 
indicates that average volatility is higher at around period 18 and 39, i.e. when 
business activities begin and cease during the day respectively. This may due to a 
combination of temperature’s variability affecting the use of domestic space heating 
at either end of the day, natural variation in sunrise/sunset timing and the effect on 
the use of artificial lighting at the start/end of the day. 
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Figure 20 Summer load duration curve for the GB system in 2015 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Winter load duration curve for the GB system in 2015 
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Figure 22 Three-dimensional demand analysis for the GB system in 2015 
 
 
Figure 23 Three-dimensional demand analysis for the GB system in winter 2015 
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Figure 24 Three-dimensional demand analysis for the GB system in summer 2015 
 
 
Figure 25 Mean and standard deviation of demand in 2015 
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Figure 26 Mean and standard deviation of demand in summer 2015 
 
 
Figure 27 Mean and standard deviation of demand in winter 2015 
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The next step was to divide each set of seasonal data into a number of blocks of 
hours. In particular it was decided to use three demand conditions per season, i.e. off-
peak, mid-peak and on-peak, plus one half-hour value for annual (winter) system 
peak. These three demand conditions were specified by using a cluster analysis in 
Stata on both summer and winter half-hourly data. 
Cluster analysis is concerned with forming groups of similar objects based on 
several measurements of different kinds made on the objects (Lattin, 2003). The key 
idea is to identify classifications of the objects that would be useful for the aims of 
the analysis. In particular demand data was first divided into a daily basis: e.g. for 
summer 211 columns (one for each day) of 48 rows each (one for each half-hour). 
This dataset was then copied into Stata, where cluster analysis for three demand 
blocks is carried out ("cluster kmeans, k(3)"). This allocated one of three blocks to 
each of the 48 periods, depending on the magnitude of the demand levels. The cluster 
column containing a list of "1", "2" and "3" was copied into Excel next to a column 
with periods from 1 to 48. The idea behind this was to show how the 48 periods have 
been grouped in three different blocks. As a further check, another cluster analysis 
with three blocks was carried out on historical winter demand data from NGC. Such 
analysis produced an identical grouping of 48 periods into three blocks as with 2015 
data. 
This dataset was then copied into Matlab, where two new columns were cre-
ated, one for summer (on 211 days) and one for winter (on 154 days), each contain-
ing 48 average demand values, one for each half-hour. Finally, these two columns 
were copied back into Stata, where the means of each block (by season) were calcu-
lated. The final result is three demand values (with their durations), i.e. off-peak, 
mid-peak and on-peak, as shown in Table 8 and 920. Some comparative analysis be-
tween summer and winter can be carried out: e.g. mid-peak demand values are very 
similar in both duration and magnitude but on-peak values are rather different, as 
previously indicated by three-dimensional graphs. It must be pointed out that any 
comparison among the three blocks in summer and winter must always take into ac-
count the fact that there is a one hour difference for the clock change. 
                                                 
20
 In order to add an “extra observation” for the annual system peak (62.4GW), the final duration of 
winter on-peak had to be reduced by one half-hour (from 29 to 28). 
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Table 8 Results of cluster analysis for demand in 2015 
Mean (in GW) Std. Err. Nr. Of Obs.
Off-peak 29.88 0.4914206 28.8324 30.92723 16
Mid-peak 39.68 0.5549357 38.4412 40.91413 11
On-peak 42.72 0.1510374 42.4069 43.03705 21
Off-peak 36.77 0.3683425 35.9175 37.61625 9
Mid-peak 40.69 0.6626024 39.1925 42.19034 10
On-peak 50.28 0.4938564 49.264 51.28719 29
[95% Conf. Int.]
Summer
Winter
 
 
Table 9 Duration of three demand blocks in 2015 
Duration Off-peak Mid-peak On-peak Off-peak Mid-peak On-peak
Half-hours 16 11 21 9 10 29
Season days 211 211 211 154 154 154
Season half-hours 10,128 7,392
Total half-hours 17,520
Total days 365
WinterSummer
 
The final step was to distribute demand values for all block of hours among the 
16 nodes.  In other words, nodal demand values were calculated by simply 
multiplying each of the six demand values (from the cluster analysis) by the 16 
distribution factors in Table 6. The result is shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28 Nodal demand by block for the GB system in 2015 
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3.3.6. Generation modelling 
After extensively surveying several sources of information, it was decided to 
adopt the “Gone Green” generation scenario for 2015/16 outlined in NGC (2009b). 
In March 2009 the Electricity Networks Strategy Group (ENSG), a cross industry 
group jointly chaired by the Department of Energy and Climate Change and Ofgem, 
ENSG published its vision of the network reinforcements required to meet the 2020 
renewable energy target (ENSG, 2009). This report is based on the “Gone Green” 
energy scenario developed by NGC and tested within ENSG covering the UK’s total 
energy demand across the electricity, heat and transport sectors. And it is exactly 
because of this “cooperation” between NGC’s and ENSG’s work that this scenario 
was adopted in this PhD’s model. Indeed the same set of generation assumptions 
have been used in a recent study which looks at the potential impact for consumers of 
a new transmission policy (Frontier Economics, 2009). In particular, the “Gone 
Green” scenario, which is presented in Figure 29, set out the requirement to: 
• Connect around 32 GW of renewable wind capacity; around 20 GW offshore 
and 10 GW onshore by 2020; 
• Account for major changes in the generation fleet due to: 
 The closure of older, coal and oil fired generating plant because of the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive. 
 The retirement due to age of existing nuclear capacity and the start of 
a replacement programme in the latter part of the next decade;  
 The expected connection of 12 GW of new gas-fired generation in the 
same timescales. 
 The bigger role played by interconnectors. 
 The development of some “clean coal” plants. 
 The growth in embedded generation, giving rise to some 15GW of 
embedded generation (including on-site CHP) in 2020. 
 The anticipated closure of some 12GW of oil and coal Fired 
generation which has opted out of the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive by 2016. 
Even though Figure 29 shows transmission connected and larger scale embed-
ded generation only, NGC’s scenario does not depend solely upon transmission con-
nected renewable solutions, but recognises the role of embedded generation in meet-
ing climate change objectives. Gone Green assumes an increase of 6GW in embed-
ded generation capacity between 2009/10 and 2020/21 to almost 15GW. Some 45% 
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of this capacity is assumed to be Combined Heat and Power plant. The remaining 
proportion (totalling some 8GW) has been assumed to come from renewable sources: 
wind, solar, tidal, biomass and hydro-power. For more detailed information on gen-
eration capacities and their underlying assumptions, the interested reader should refer 
to the full explanation in NGC (2009b). 
In the end it was decided that the model should include a maximum of ten 
generation technologies. The final capacities for these ten generation technologies in 
the model were calculated based on the following methodology: 
• Identify generation capacities for 2015 in the “Gone Green” scenario (Table 
10). 
• Group NGC data in order to obtain 10 technologies: e.g. combine off-shore 
and on-shore wind together (Figure 30). 
• Multiply all capacities by availability factor (except for wind, which is 
modelled later separately) to account for maintenance. 
• Map generation capacities from NGC’s 17 zones to the 15 nodes in the 
model, by using Table 5. 
The final result is presented in Table 11.  
Figure 29 Generation capacities in “Gone Green” (NGC, 2009b) 
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Table 10 2015/16 generation capacities by zone in “Gone Green” (NGC, 2009b) 
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Figure 30 Ten generation technologies in “Gone Green” (own calculations) 
Installed capacity by technology in 2015/16 (MW)
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Table 11 Final generation capacities by node in 2015/16 
Sum of 2015/16 
(in MW) NW-SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
Type N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Grand 
Total
CCGT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,733 2,576 7,281 0 4,735 3,538 0 815 3,236 3,099 27,011
CHP 0 11 0 0 111 108 0 329 1,096 0 205 0 0 0 0 142 2,002
Other gas 10 1,448 0 0 0 0 0 32 165 0 157 0 0 133 0 275 2,219
Coal 0 0 0 0 1,958 0 0 1,660 9,088 0 4,215 0 0 0 2,720 0 19,641
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 1,831 966 1,925 0 0 0 960 0 1,009 865 0 7,555
Interconnector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,488 0 2,488
Biomass 0 0 0 0 41 41 90 0 212 0 315 0 0 0 0 0 698
Wind 2,005 1,730 0 0 0 3,166 0 1,603 300 0 299 1,065 0 0 1,129 0 11,297
Hydro 325 0 140 192 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 677
Pumped storage 285 0 0 0 418 0 0 1,904 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,607
Grand Total 2,625 3,189 140 192 2,528 5,165 2,788 10,028 18,143 0 9,926 5,563 0 1,956 10,437 3,515 76,195
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3.3.7. Wind modelling 
The output of renewable technologies such as wind, wave and solar, is 
intermittent in nature. In particular their electricity production levels vary with 
environmental conditions, such as wind strength, over which the operator has no 
control and only limited ability to forecast. These fluctuations have the potential to 
affect the operation and economics of electricity networks, markets and the output of 
other generation technologies. They can also affect the reliability of electricity 
supplies and the balancing actions needed to ensure demand meets supply every 
instant (UKERC, 2006).  
Conventional electricity markets models often lack the capability to represent 
the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources like wind power. Wind farms are 
then modelled like conventional power stations, while their intermittent nature is 
usually represented by a lower capacity factor (e.g. 30%). However, as shown in 
Kahn (2004), this limited approach does not achieve the objective of representing the 
value of wind energy from a system operator’s point of view. Furthermore this PhD 
looks at how wind output variability may affect spatial prices21. Therefore, similarly 
to what had been proposed in DeCarolis & Keith (2006), it was decided to increase 
the complexity of the dispatch part of the model in order to capture generation pat-
terns for different wind conditions.  
With regards to wind energy production, there are several ways in which its 
intermittent nature may be modelled (Cust, Neuhoff, & Keats, 2007). Overall there is 
a trade-off a trade-off between capturing as much of the detail of wind’s variability 
as possible and computing tractability (Neuhoff et al., 2008). For this PhD wind 
energy was modelled based on the following methodology 
First of all, it was decided that the model would run three wind conditions, i.e. 
low, medium and high, for every demand scenario22. Because the average load factor 
for British wind farms is believed to be around 30% (Dale et al., 2003),  the medium 
                                                 
21
 Indeed final model results will show that the nodal price at any one location with the same demand 
level may vary widely depending on the wind condition.  
22
 This methodology is very similar to the one adopted in Pöyry Energy Consulting (2008b), but only 
with fewer wind conditions due to computational limits 
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value was set at 30%. In other words, under a medium wind profile, over a year wind 
farms produce 30% of their installed capacities; the other two conditions, low and 
high, were set at 5% and 75% respectively. Because for every demand scenario there 
are three wind profiles, the three corresponding frequencies had to be calculated. In-
deed these frequencies are necessary to “weigh” all results produced under the same 
demand scenario.  
To this purpose, a single profile, with 17,520 half-hourly values (per unit), was 
assumed for all wind farms across the country. In other words it is assumed that wind 
speed varies in time but not in space and that geographical differences are smoothed 
over time. The half-hourly profile (per unit) for a typical wind farm had been 
calculated in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Imperial College London 
(Strbac et al. (2007) and is presented in Figure 31. 
Then, similarly to what was done with demand, wind data was divided into 
summer and winter and the relative frequencies were calculated for each of the three 
wind conditions. The final results are presented in Table 12. For instance, in summer, 
wind energy output is between 0 and 10% of its capacity23 for 34% of the time. Also, 
not surprisingly, in winter the high wind scenario has a relative frequency of 34% 
rather than 14% in summer. 
The wind profiles developed by following this procedure provide only an 
approximation of what is a highly complex situation. This level of sophistication is 
regarded as appropriate for the current application, as the intention is to explore the 
influence of locational pricing in relative terms, rather than seeking to produce 
realistic values for cost for each scenario. This is clearly an area for further 
development. 
 
                                                 
23
 It must be noticed that the model always applies the mid value of these output ranges (in this case 
5%). 
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Figure 31 Half-hourly wind profile the GB system (own calculations) 
 
 
Table 12 Three wind conditions for the GB system (own calculations) 
SUMMER
3 wind conditions
Half-hours:10128
> <=
Frequency 
distribution
Low 5% 0.00% 10.00% 0.34
Medium 30% 10% 50% 0.52
High 75% 50.00% 100.00% 0.14
Total 1.00
WINTER
3 wind conditions
Half-hours:7392
> <=
Frequency 
distribution
Low 5% 0.00% 10.00% 0.17
Medium 30% 10% 50% 0.49
High 75% 50.00% 100.00% 0.34
Total 1.00
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3.3.8. Cost modelling 
Given that variable costs of generation grow proportionally with output, short-
run marginal costs (SRMC) are equal to variable costs. The variable costs of most 
thermal generating plant are dominated by the cost of the fuel used in the power 
station (e.g. coal). However the cost of any carbon permit necessary to cover the 
resulting CO2 emissions is likely to become a more significant component of 
variable cost. This implies that  
SRMC = variable generating costs= (cost of fuel) + (cost carbon permit) + 
(variable cost of operation and maintenance) 
Therefore specific generation costs in the model were calculated on a SRMC 
basis, but ignoring variable O&M costs.24 Furthermore, due to the topic of this PhD, 
it seemed sensible to adopt the cost assumptions included in the British 
Government’s most recent Energy White Paper (DECC, 2009b). In particular, among 
its four scenarios, its” Timely Investment, Moderate Demand” was chosen because it 
seemed the closest to a "central case":  
• The global recession continues to 2010 and low demand keeps prices low in 
the short term. 
• In the medium term, global economic growth picks up and pushes up demand 
for energy. 
• Investment is made in a timely manner, so supply is sufficient to meet 
growing demand.  
The main inputs used for calculating SRMC (in £/MWh) of fossil-fuelled 
power stations are presented in Table 13. The latter also includes the assumption of 
£73/MWh for the reference demand price. Thermal efficiencies for different fuels 
were taken from DECC (2009a).  
Variable costs for all remaining technologies were derived from a combination 
of various sources of information (Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen, 2008; 
MIT, 2009; NGC, 2009b; Pöyry Energy Consulting, 2008a; Pöyry Energy Consult-
ing, 2008b; Pöyry Energy Consulting, 2009; Redpoint Energy, 2009; SKM, 2008; 
                                                 
24
 Variable O&M costs were ignored because 1) various estimates of their future values seemed very 
inconsistent and 2) their relative contribution towards total variable costs was rather small anyway. 
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Strbac et al., 2007; Weigt et al., 2009). First of all, nuclear power’s fuel cost, which 
is known to be very low (which allows this technology to constantly run as 
baseload), was specifically estimated from MIT (2009).  Estimating a SRMC for in-
terconnectors does not depend on assumptions for a specific generation technology 
of course but on those regarding the future price of wholesale electricity on the con-
tinent. In the end it was decided to adopt a slightly higher value than the one used in 
Pöyry Energy Consulting (2008b). 
With regards to biomass energy, its cost was rather difficult to assess simply 
because of the variety of fuels (e.g. woodchip) that can be burnt in a biomass plant. 
Since SKM (2008) assessed costs and benefits of accommodating high levels of all 
renewable technologies into the GB grid, taking a single value for biomass plants 
from that particular source seemed a reasonable choice. Moreover, pricing wind was 
an easy task because this technology does not have any fuel cost. Therefore, similarly 
to Weigt et al.(2009), a marginal cost of “zero” was chosen for wind.  
Estimating hydro, on the other hand, was less intuitive. Indeed this technology 
has “zero” fuel costs. However, it must be remembered that hydroelectric plants in 
the UK (and in other power systems like Spain), are only dispatched to shave peak 
load rather than to run as a baseload technology like wind energy. For this 
operational reason, its SRMC must represent the opportunity cost of displacing an 
expensive fossil fuel plant rather its “zero” fuel cost. Therefore, similarly to what had 
been done in NGC (2009b) or Pöyry Energy Consulting (2008b), it was decided to 
adopt a SRMC, which is higher than the most expensive fossil-fuelled plant but 
cheaper than most expensive technology, i.e. pumped storage. 
Table 14 shows the final assumptions on SRMC for all generation technologies 
included in the model. 
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Table 13 Cost assumptions for fossil fuels in 2015 (2008 money) 
"Timely Investment, Moderate Demand"
2015 Scenario (2008 money)
Oil ($/bbl) 75
Coal ($/t) 80
Gas (p/th) 63
Carbon (£/tCO2) 29
Wholesale electricity (£/MWh) 73
Exchange rate $/£ 1.6
 
 
Table 14 Final assumptions for SRMC in 2015 (£/MWh, 2008 money) 
CCGT 55
CHP 63
Other gas 94
Coal 46
Nuclear 2
Interconnector 70
Biomass 56
Wind 0
Hydro 80
Pumped storage 90
SRMC (£/MWh)
 
 
3.3.9. Final scenarios 
Because the demand function is believed to have a large impact on welfare 
results, it is suggested to carry out a sensitivity analysis on demand elasticity. Indeed 
Green (2007) shows that a higher absolute value of elasticity (i.e. -0.25) leads to a 
larger (positive) difference in welfare between LMP and UNI. However while his 
nodal model refers to an electricity market in 1996, this PhD’s model looks at a 
future scenario, in 2015. Because it is believed that demand response to price 
movements is likely to increase in coming years (e.g. after deploying more smart 
meters), this model applies a value of -0.25 (rather than -0.15) for its basic case and 
of -0.50 (rather than -0.40) for its higher case.    
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Finally, Table 15 shows the type and number of parameters which have been 
selected for the model while Table 16 presents the lists of all cases which have been 
run by the model.  
This chapter outlined how the model has been developed. In particular, 
paragraphs 3.1-3.2 described how the model has been conceived from a theoretical 
perspective (e.g. optimal spatial pricing). The remaining paragraphs explained how 
the model has been built in practice (e.g. definition of scenarios for the British 
electricity market). The next section will critically analyse the main results from the 
model and provide some of the policy insights which flow from those results. 
 
Table 15 List of parameters for the model 
Blocks of hours 3
Seasons 2
Typical days (e.g. work) 1
Annual system peak demand 1
Wind profiles 3
Elasticity values 2
Fuel prices 1
Carbon Prices 1
Transmission capacity 1
Conventional capacity 1
Wind capacity 1
Pricing mechanisms 2
Total scenarios 84
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Table 16 Final scenarios for GB system in 2015 
# Season Block of Hours
Load 
Factor
Freq. 
Distrib Scenarios -0.25 -0.50 -0.25 -0.50
1 Winter Off-peak 5% 0.17 Winter_Off-peak_0.05
2 Winter Off-peak 30% 0.49 Winter_Off-peak_0.3
3 Winter Off-peak 75% 0.34 Winter_Off-peak_0.75
4 Winter Mid-peak 5% 0.17 Winter_Mid-peak_0.05
5 Winter Mid-peak 30% 0.49 Winter_Mid-peak_0.3
6 Winter Mid-peak 75% 0.34 Winter_Mid-peak_0.75
7 Winter On-peak 5% 0.17 Winter_On-peak_0.05
8 Winter On-peak 30% 0.49 Winter_On-peak_0.3
9 Winter On-peak 75% 0.34 Winter_On-peak_0.75
10 Summer Off-peak 5% 0.34 Summer_Off-peak_0.05
11 Summer Off-peak 30% 0.52 Summer_Off-peak_0.3
12 Summer Off-peak 75% 0.14 Summer_Off-peak_0.75
13 Summer Mid-peak 5% 0.34 Summer_Mid-peak_0.05
14 Summer Mid-peak 30% 0.52 Summer_Mid-peak_0.3
15 Summer Mid-peak 75% 0.14 Summer_Mid-peak_0.75
16 Summer On-peak 5% 0.34 Summer_On-peak_0.05
17 Summer On-peak 30% 0.52 Summer_On-peak_0.3
18 Summer On-peak 75% 0.14 Summer_On-peak_0.75
19 Winter Annual peak 5% 0.17 Winter_Annual peak_0.05
20 Winter Annual peak 30% 0.49 Winter_Annual peak_0.3
21 Winter Annual peak 75% 0.34 Winter_Annual peak_0.75
Demand Elasticity
Demand Conditions Wind LMP UNI
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4. MODELLING RESULTS AND POLICY INSIGHTS 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to present an analysis of the main 
results from the model, for both pricing approaches, and to discuss the policy 
implications which may be drawn from those results. The first section is structured in 
three parts: energy (e.g. losses), welfare and prices.  
4.1. MODELLING RESULTS 
4.1.1. Energy results 
Annual demand for electricity under LMP is 2.2% higher than under UNI with 
a central elasticity, as indicated in Table 17. This seems to be because LMP, being 
more efficient, tends to result in lower congestion costs (as paragraph 4.1.3 will 
show), which lead to lower electricity prices and ultimately to a higher consumption. 
Indeed, the results from individual runs have revealed that the difference in 
consumption between LMP and UNI is bigger in those scenarios where reference 
demand is higher, i.e. winter on-peak and annual peak. 
With the assumption of a more responsive demand, i.e. elasticity equal to -
0.50, the demand gap is even higher, almost 3%. Interestingly, it can be observed that 
elasticity seems to lead to greater consumption of electricity, whatever the pricing 
mechanism. Indeed this is just one of many examples which show how sensitive final 
results are to the value of demand elasticity in this type of modelling. 
Because of the energy balance constraint, the results on total generation mirror 
those on demand, so that total supply is consistently greater under LMP in both 
cases. However, it is the difference within the generation mix which offers more 
interesting results. 
With regards to wind, Tables 17 and 18 show that total wind and nuclear out-
put are identical in absolute values (but slightly different in percentage of course) 
across pricing mechanisms and across elasticity values. This is because in this model 
both wind and nuclear energy have almost zero marginal cost and thus they are al-
ways dispatched prior to any of the other more expensive technologies. This result 
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also suggests that the level of congestion on the network has never been so high that 
either wind energy (coming from the North) or nuclear had to be curtailed.25  
With regards to renewables other than wind though, their output under LMP is 
85% and 51% higher than under UNI, with central and high elasticity respectively, as 
seen in Table18. Total low-carbon electricity (=wind + nuclear + other renewables) 
under both pricing approaches represents around 26% and 25% of the total 
production mix with central and high elasticity respectively. And because the output 
from other renewables is much greater under LMP, its low-carbon electricity is less 
than 1% higher than under UNI, for both elasticity values.  The latter results may 
suggest that LMP’s “green credentials” are marginally better than UNI’s.  
Table 19 presents the annual results in terms of network externalities, i.e. 
transmission losses and congestion. With regards to the former, in the central case 
they are bigger in absolute values (TWh) but smaller in relative terms (%). Such a 
result should not come as a surprise: as previously seen in Table 17, consumption 
and production are higher in absolute values under LMP and, because of the energy 
balance, so are the losses; however, because LMP is a more efficient form of 
managing network externalities, its losses tend to be lower in percentage terms than 
UNI’s. And this represents a key difference, since incentive targets for reducing 
losses are always expressed in percentage values of the total demand. In the high 
elasticity case, LMP scores even better since its losses are lower both in absolute and 
relative terms than UNI’s (even though consumption is higher under LMP). Such a 
difference suggests that the more responsive demand is to price movements, the more 
LMP is able to outperform UNI in minimizing losses. 
With regards to levels of congestion on the grid, Table 19 shows that, in the 
central elasticity case, at least one transmission line (not always the same) has to be 
constrained for 58% of the time in both pricing mechanisms. However, with a higher 
elasticity, the GB power system with LMP performs slightly better than with UNI, 
experiencing congestion 65% of the time rather than 69%. Once again this suggests 
                                                 
25
 Under UNI, it would be the system operator which would constrain-off wind energy. Under LMP, 
such action would be automatically “performed” by movements in nodal prices (e.g. a negative price 
where the wind farm contributing to the constraint is located). 
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that a higher elasticity would “enhance” LMP’s greater economic efficiency com-
pared with UNI.   
Finally Table 20 highlights which particular transmission line faces congestion 
and for how many scenarios. Line 6, for instance, which corresponds to the so-called 
Cheviot boundary, is the main interconnector between the grid operating area owned 
by National Grid and that of SPTL, one of the two Scottish transmission companies. 
This boundary is often congested because there is an oversupply of cheap generation 
north of the line: e.g. node 6 has an installed capacity of over 1.8GW from nuclear 
energy and over 3GW from wind energy while local demand is between 1.4GW (in 
summer) and 2.4GW in winter. This is the typical situation which leads to net 
injections and power flows going south, where there are larger load requirements. 
For similar reasons, lines 12 and 14 are often congested under both pricing 
approaches and in both elasticity cases. These have to be constrained in all winter on-
peak scenarios but also in those summer on-peak scenarios with lower wind 
conditions. There are also some key differences between pricing systems though. 
Line 9 is congested for nearly a quarter (24%) of the scenarios under LMP but never 
under UNI, for both elasticity cases. This difference is because what happens at node 
9 in winter on-peak scenarios: under UNI only 9GW of coal-fired and 0.3GW of 
wind generation are dispatched; however LMP is able to produce a nodal price which 
is high enough to dispatch also the 7.2GW of more expensive CCGTs. And, because 
local demand is only 6GW with system peak conditions, such situation ultimately 
leads to congestion on line 9 under LMP but not under UNI.   
Finally Figure 32 provides a graphical description of where congestion occurs 
on the network under both pricing mechanisms. The yellow and blue arrows indicate 
which line is constrained and in which direction under UNI and LMP respectively. 
Line 14 tends to be congested for almost one third of the scenarios simply because 
there is not enough generation capacity at node 14 for meeting load requirements 
during the year, whatever the pricing approach.   
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Table 17 Demand and production of electricity in 2015 
 
 
Table 18 Production of low-carbon electricity in 2015 
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Table 19 Transmission losses and congestion in 2015 
 
 
Table 20 Congestion on individual transmission lines in 2015 
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Figure 32 Network map with congestion on transmission lines under LMP and UNI in 2015 
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4.1.2. Welfare results 
As mentioned in chapter 3, one of the most challenging modelling decisions 
was to specify the values for the maximum capacity of each transmission line. One of 
the criteria adopted was to investigate the impact that different network capacity 
levels might have upon the objective value, i.e. the annual social welfare. Therefore, 
before running the final scenarios, several sets of total transmission capacity (T) with 
the same generation set (G) were tested. The results of a selection from these test 
runs are presented in Table 21; they show the annual difference in welfare between 
LMP and UNI, depending different values of T/G ratios (used as a simple, spatially 
insensitive proxy for a measure of reliability). The minimum and maximum values of 
these ratios are respectively 81%, which corresponds to the actual values in 2008, 
and 96%, which is the output of a separate model for optimal transmission 
investments (described in 3.3.4). 
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Following a review of various sources of market information (e.g. NGC 
(2009a) and NGC (2009b)) and a comparison of welfare results from these 
sensitivity runs, in the end it was decided to adopt transmission capacities that 
resulted in a T/G of 86.4%. This ratio, which is still much higher than the 2008 
figure, seems a reasonable assumption in terms of expected network investments 
indicated from the review. Clearly T/G is not an accurate measure of reliability 
because it depends on where generation and loads are located on the grid. However 
this simple sensitivity analysis clearly shows that the benefit of adopting LMP grows 
exponentially with the level of congestion (i.e. with lower T/G). This result also 
suggests that LMP is likely to be a better tool for investigating the need for grid 
reinforcements. 
A selected set of the key results from this modelling exercise are presented in 
Tables 22 and 23. Social welfare may be calculated in two ways: either as the 
difference between consumer benefit and cost of dispatch; or as the sum of consumer 
surplus, generators’ profit and grid profit (which is explained later). First of all it 
must be observed that results for social welfare, consumer benefit and consumer 
surplus are several times bigger than their corresponding values for the supply side 
(e.g. cost of dispatch). The reason for this is because in the electricity market the 
demand curve is typically very steep and thus calculating the area underneath (e.g. 
consumer benefit) will always produce values which are much bigger in relative 
terms  than those for producers (especially if calculations include the intercept on the 
y-axis).  
Also Table 22 shows a value of annual social welfare with LMP which is 0.2% 
higher than with UNI in the central case. It must be highlighted, however, that this 
apparently small percentage difference corresponds to a not insignificant absolute 
value of around £128 million a year. In the high elasticity case the difference in 
welfare is over £143 million a year, which suggests that the more responsive demand 
is, the better LMP scores over UNI in terms of welfare. In general social welfare is 
lower in absolute value with a more elastic – i.e. flatter – demand function due the 
smaller area below the linear function and the consequently lower value of consumer 
surplus. 
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In the central case, consumer benefit and consumer surplus are 0.8% and 4.3% 
greater under LMP in the central case. Overall it may be argued that consumers 
would be better off in a power system with optimal spatial pricing because the latter 
is more efficient at matching supply and demand with the highest marginal 
willingness to pay.  
Looking at the supply side, Table 22 indicates that the annual cost of dispatch 
is 3.3% higher with LMP in the central case. Such a result derives from the definition 
of nodal pricing: when a line is congested, the price in an import-constrained area 
goes up and this attracts the more expensive local generators into the market, rather 
than a cheaper producer in the export-constrained area, where the price has gone 
down.   
One of the largest differences in relative terms is shown in Table 24, where 
total generators’ profit under LMP is 31.4% lower in the central case. Such an 
outcome derives from the fact that the annual average price under LMP is 8.8% 
lower than under UNI, as shown in Table 24 (all results on prices are presented in 
paragraph 4.1.3). Indeed bigger profits under UNI are consistent with having higher 
revenues (Table 24) and lower production costs (Table 22). 
Grid profit (Table 23), or merchandising surplus, is by definition earned by the 
transmission company under optimal spatial pricing. On average, demand exceeds 
generation at the higher-priced nodes, and the resulting financial surplus can be put 
towards the fixed costs of the transmission network. The remaining costs are 
generally recovered through distorting tariffs (e.g. TNUoS charges in the GB 
market). As long as the regulator takes this surplus from LMP into account when 
setting limits on those tariffs, they will be lower than if all the costs of the 
transmission system had to be recovered through them. Under UNI instead grid profit 
is always negative because it represents the cost of losses. In the British electricity 
market this cost is currently socialized via ex-post non-locational balancing (BSUoS) 
charges levied upon all grid users. Because this type of transmission tariff is not 
modelled in this thesis, any comparison of grid profit values between the two pricing 
mechanisms would simply be misleading. 
Optimal spatial pricing for electricity and its impact on renewable generation technologies and 
their operations  
 109 
As noted in Chapter 1, one of the main reasons for developing an optimization 
model for this PhD was to investigate the impact of different forms of spatial pricing 
upon the profitability of renewable generation technologies. Table 24 shows that 
wind energy’s annual profit is 18.6% lower under LMP than under UNI in the central 
case. Because annual production from wind farms is the same for both pricing 
mechanisms (Table 17), this result derives from the fact that, as we have seen, energy 
prices on average are lower in an LMP environment than in a UNI one. This is 
possibly one of the main reasons why wind developers in Great Britain have 
historically opposed efficient forms of locational signals (Di Castelnuovo, 2004b). 
However it should be noticed that these results on wind farms’ profits do not take 
into account the further income arising from selling Renewable Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs).     
Furthermore, Table 24 also shows that the difference in profits from wind 
energy is lower, at 12.7%, in the high elasticity case. Once again the explanation may 
be found in the price dynamics. With a more responsive demand, uniform prices, 
which are the same across all nodes at any one particular time, are not able to go as 
high as they would with a lower (in absolute value) demand elasticity. As a 
consequence the difference in average prices between LMP and UNI is only -6.3% in 
the high elasticity case, rather than -8.9% in the base case, as shown in Table 24. 
And this result corresponds to a narrower difference in profits for the high elasticity 
case. 
Overall it appears that producers are worse off with LMP than with UNI, while 
it is the opposite result for consumers. This implies that most of the gains from 
spatially differentiated prices come from the demand side. Finally, the consistency of 
all results with different levels of demand response, suggests that model’s results are 
robust to changes in demand elasticity, which is the main driver for both prices and 
welfare. 
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Table 21 Sensitivity analysis with different transmission capacities in 2015 
2008
T/G=81% T/G=81% T/G=86% T/G=88% T/G=96%
Central elasticity
-0.25 N/A 2,470 128 31 9
Difference in welfare between 
LMP and UNI using different 
T/G (in £ million, 2008 money)
2015
 
 
Table 22 Social welfare, consumer benefit and cost of dispatch in 2015 
(A)=(B)-(C) Objective function - 
Max social welfare (in £ 
million)
(B)   Total consumer benefit 
(in £ million)
(C)  Total cost of dispatch 
(in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 65,766 79,596 13,829
High elasticity
-0.50 39,539 54,097 14,557
(A)=(B)-(C) Objective function - 
Max social welfare (in £ 
million)
(B)   Total consumer benefit 
(in £ million)
(C)  Total cost of dispatch 
(in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 65,894 80,187 14,293
High elasticity
-0.50 39,683 54,855 15,172
(Welfare LMP)-(Welfare UNI) 
(in £ million)
% Difference in 
social welfare
% Difference in consumer 
benefit
% Difference in cost of 
dispatch
Central elasticity
-0.25 128 0.19% 0.74% 3.35%
High elasticity
-0.50 143 0.36% 1.40% 4.22%
UNI
LMP
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Difference between LMP and 
UNI
 
 
Table 23 Consumer surplus and generators' profits in 2015 
(D) Total consumer surplus 
(in £ million)
(E) Total generators' profit 
(in £ million)
(F)=(G)-(E)-(C)  Total grid 
profit (in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 55,556 10,581 -371 
High elasticity
-0.50 29,806 10,115 -381 
(D) Total consumer surplus 
(in £ million)
(E) Total generators' profit 
(in £ million)
(F)=(G)-(E)-(C)  Total grid 
profit (in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 57,948 7,258 689
High elasticity
-0.50 31,472 7,630 581
% Difference in consumer 
surplus
% Difference in generators' 
profit
Central elasticity
-0.25 4.31% -31.41%
High elasticity
-0.50 5.59% -24.57%
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Difference between LMP and 
UNI
UNI
LMP
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Table 24 Revenues, average prices and wind energy’s profit in 2015 
(G) Total revenue (in £ 
million)
Demand-weighted average 
price (£/MWh)
Total profit for wind, 
without ROCs (in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 24,040 63.73 2,140
High elasticity
-0.50 24,291 62.68 2,044
(G) Total revenue (in £ 
million)
Demand-weighted average 
price (£/MWh)
Total profit for wind, 
without ROCs (in £ million)
Central elasticity
-0.25 22,240 58.13 1,741
High elasticity
-0.50 23,383 58.75 1,784
% Difference in total 
revenues
% Difference in average 
price % Difference in wind profit
Central elasticity
-0.25 -7.49% -8.79% -18.63%
High elasticity
-0.50 -3.74% -6.26% -12.72%
LMP
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Summary of annual results 
(2008 money)
Difference between LMP and 
UNI
UNI
 
4.1.3. Price results 
Tables 25 and 26 present 2015 time-weighted average prices by node under 
UNI and under LMP respectively, in 2008 money. Table 27 shows the percentage 
difference by location between the two forms of network pricing. Naturally UNI do 
not vary by node. However it is believed that their representation by node in Table 
25 may help a comparison with the corresponding LMP values. The central case 
indicates that at northern nodes (1-6), LMP prices are at least £10/MWh lower than 
UNI’s. This result suggests, as might be expected, that generators located in the north 
of the country, such as on-shore wind farms, are likely to favour a market based on 
uniform pricing like the current one.   
Looking at the central case in Table 27, it is apparent that from nodes 1 to 12 
the percentage difference between LMP and UNI prices remains constant between 
13% and 17%. However the situation changes completely from node 14. At this par-
ticular location the annual average nodal price is actually almost 5% higher than the 
uniform price. Such an outcome is due to the very large local imbalance: 0.8GW of 
CCGT, 0.1GW of gas turbines and 1GW of nuclear cannot meet a reference demand 
that varies between 6GW in the summer and over 12GW in winter. Because of this 
imbalance, there is a net import of power which makes line 14 congested in all win-
ter scenarios (as already shown in Table 20), thus leading to a higher nodal price. 
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At nodes 15 and 16 the difference between nodal and uniform price is negative, 
like at northern nodes. However the gap is now much smaller at 7% in the central 
case because at these locations there is not enough cheap generation to meet the load 
requirements. Thus the price has to go up in order to push more expensive generators 
into the market (e.g. 2.5GW from the interconnector at node 15).   
In general, Figures 33 and 34 suggest that in a GB market with LMP prices 
increase going from north to south along the network. The same spatial price 
distribution may be observed on a network map, as shown in Figure 35 and 36. This 
outcome is to be expected for two reasons: firstly, 7GW of wind farms with almost 
zero marginal costs are spread across the first six nodes in the north; secondly 90% 
of system load requirements come from the last ten nodes in the south.  
With regards to a sensitivity analysis on elasticity values, Table 25 indicates 
that with a more responsive demand the annual average price under UNI is lower 
than with a less responsive one, as already explained in section 4.1.2. Looking at the 
corresponding LMP results in Table 26, it is apparent that optimal prices vary more 
in the central case, as demand is less responsive to changes in price. Indeed nodal 
prices with central and high elasticity values show a standard deviation of 3.9 and 3.3 
respectively.  
Individual results from every scenario are presented in Tables 28-31. Overall 
prices seem to behave consistently under both LMP and UNI and in both elasticity 
cases. That is, prices fall as wind output goes up (e.g. moving from 5% to 30% wind 
factor) due to a larger availability of cheap generation; and prices rise as demand 
grows because increasingly more expensive generators have to be dispatched. The 
latter dynamic is clearly evident by looking at wind-weighted averages in the tables.  
Finally Table 32 shows maximum and minimum price from all scenarios con-
sidered in this thesis. Interestingly UNI and LMP achieve an identical maximum 
price (at system peak) but they greatly differ in terms of the minimum price. For in-
stance, in the central case, UNI and LMP show a minimum price of £49/MWh and 
43£/MWh respectively. In both cases this price corresponds to a scenario with the 
lowest demand in the summer and with the higher wind factor 
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(=Summer_Offpeak_0.75). This may suggest that LMP is even more efficient than 
UNI in the lower part of the demand curve. 
Table 25 Time-weighted average prices under UNI in 2015 
NW-SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73
High 
elasticity
-0.50 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68
NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73
High 
elasticity
-0.50 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68
Time-weighted 
average prices (in 
£/MWh, 2008 money)
UNI
 
 
Table 26 Time-weighted average prices under LMP in 2015 
NW-SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 53.12 53.18 53.29 53.29 52.97 53.38 54.52 54.72
High 
elasticity
-0.50 54.48 54.53 54.64 54.64 54.61 54.70 55.53 55.70
NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 53.29 55.48 55.03 66.74 59.26 59.42
High 
elasticity
-0.50 54.04 56.43 55.18 65.74 60.43 60.59
Time-weighted 
average prices (in 
£/MWh, 2008 money)
LMP
 
 
Table 27 Differences between LMP and UNI time-weighted average prices in 2015 
NW-SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 -16.64% -16.54% -16.37% -16.37% -16.89% -16.24% -14.44% -14.14%
High 
elasticity
-0.50 -13.09% -12.99% -12.83% -12.83% -12.87% -12.74% -11.41% -11.13%
NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Central 
elasticity
-0.25 -16.38% -12.94% -13.64% 4.72% -7.01% -6.75%
High 
elasticity
-0.50 -13.78% -9.96% -11.95% 4.88% -3.59% -3.34%
Difference between 
LMP and UNI prices 
at each node
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Figure 33 Time-weighted average prices in 2015 (demand elasticity -0.25) 
UNI vs. LMP (Elasticity = -0.25)
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Figure 34 Time-weighted average prices in 2015 (demand elasticity -0.50)  
UNI vs. LMP (Elasticity = -0.50)
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Figure 35 Network map with average prices (£/MWh) under LMP in 2015 (demand elasticity -0.25) 
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Figure 36 Network map with average prices (£/MWh) under LMP in 2015 (demand elasticity -0.50) 
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Table 28 Prices across all scenarios under LMP in 2015 (elasticity =-0.25) 
Central elasticity
-0.25
NW-
SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
Scenarios N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Winter_Off-peak_0.05 55.60      55.54      55.41      55.41      55.14      55.17      55.32      55.12      54.54      55.36      55.36      61.07      58.02      58.30      
Winter_Off-peak_0.3 53.04      53.10      53.21      53.21      53.21      53.31      54.08      54.42      53.91      55.36      55.36      60.69      57.66      57.98      
Winter_Off-peak_0.75 44.88      45.13      45.59      45.59      46.04      46.21      49.95      50.84      50.46      52.58      52.34      57.96      55.36      55.36      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.05 55.86      55.79      55.65      55.65      55.34      55.36      55.36      55.36      54.76      55.36      55.36      62.34      58.98      59.20      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.3 54.11      54.16      54.25      54.25      54.21      54.30      54.94      55.11      54.53      55.36      55.36      62.12      58.75      59.00      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.75 44.87      45.13      45.61      45.61      46.04      46.24      52.98      53.93      53.48      55.36      55.23      61.39      58.05      58.37      
Winter_On-peak_0.05 65.03      64.92      64.70      64.70      64.27      64.26      64.05      63.45      55.36      64.28      64.36      82.78      70.00      70.15      
Winter_On-peak_0.3 55.70      55.73      55.78      55.78      55.65      55.71      56.00      55.91      55.36      56.90      55.36      82.78      62.21      62.28      
Winter_On-peak_0.75 52.37      52.61      53.07      53.07      53.45      53.64      55.06      55.36      55.14      56.26      55.36      82.78      61.24      61.39      
Summer_Off-peak_0.05 51.75      51.70      51.61      51.61      51.41      51.47      51.84      51.89      51.43      53.06      53.00      57.35      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.3 48.96      49.02      49.15      49.15      46.04      49.33      50.26      50.76      46.04      52.33      52.26      57.29      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.75 43.22      43.47      43.92      43.92      44.38      44.47      45.66      46.04      46.04      47.98      47.88      53.34      51.19      51.23      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.05 55.80      55.74      55.59      55.59      55.30      55.32      55.36      55.36      54.74      55.36      55.36      62.02      58.74      58.97      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.3 53.83      53.88      53.97      53.97      53.95      54.04      54.71      54.93      54.37      55.36      55.36      61.75      58.46      58.73      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.75 44.85      45.12      45.60      45.60      46.04      46.23      52.75      53.71      53.27      55.36      55.09      60.95      57.70      58.03      
Summer_On-peak_0.05 55.99      55.91      55.76      55.76      55.43      55.44      55.36      55.36      54.83      55.36      55.36      63.02      59.51      59.69      
Summer_On-peak_0.3 54.62      54.67      54.74      54.74      54.70      54.78      55.34      55.36      54.80      55.36      55.36      62.88      59.33      59.54      
Summer_On-peak_0.75 44.89      45.15      45.62      45.62      46.04      46.25      53.36      54.30      53.82      55.36      55.36      62.17      58.66      58.94      
Winter_Annual peak_0.05 90.00      90.70      90.62      90.62      90.00      90.49      90.63      90.00      55.36      91.61      91.50      134.61    98.84      99.35      
Winter_Annual peak_0.3 83.74      83.89      84.04      84.04      84.08      84.23      84.86      84.90      55.36      86.33      55.36      134.61    93.17      93.67      
Winter_Annual peak_0.75 60.62      60.87      61.34      61.34      61.67      61.85      63.05      63.61      55.36      65.19      55.36      134.61    70.64      71.00      
Winter_Off-peak 50.73      50.83      51.02      51.02      51.13      51.24      52.90      53.34      52.86      54.42      54.34      59.84      56.94      57.15      
Winter_Mid-peak 51.30      51.40      51.58      51.58      51.66      51.77      54.35      54.76      54.22      55.36      55.31      61.91      58.55      58.82      
Winter_On-peak 56.17      56.25      56.38      56.38      56.38      56.47      57.05      57.01      55.28      57.94      56.89      82.78      63.21      63.32      
Summer_Off-peak 49.09      49.14      49.25      49.25      47.61      49.37      50.15      50.48      47.85      51.97      51.90      56.76      54.77      54.78      
Summer_Mid-peak 53.23      53.28      53.34      53.34      53.30      53.38      54.65      54.90      54.34      55.36      55.32      61.73      58.45      58.71      
Summer_On-peak 53.72      53.75      53.81      53.81      53.73      53.81      55.07      55.21      54.67      55.36      55.36      62.83      59.30      59.51      
Winter_Annual peak 77.03      77.31      77.53      77.53      77.55      77.77      78.50      78.61      55.36      80.12      61.50      134.61    86.55      87.01      
Time-weighted average 53.12 53.18 53.29 53.29 52.97 53.38 54.52 54.72 53.29 55.48 55.03 66.74 59.26 59.42
Prices (£/MWh, 2008 money)
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Table 29 Prices across all scenarios under LMP in 2015 (elasticity =-0.50) 
Central elasticity
-0.50
NW-
SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
Scenarios N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Winter_Off-peak_0.05 55.76      55.69      55.55      55.55      55.26      55.28      55.36      55.30      54.68      55.36      55.36      61.58      58.42      58.68      
Winter_Off-peak_0.3 53.60      53.66      53.75      53.75      53.74      53.83      54.52      54.78      54.23      55.36      55.36      61.28      58.13      58.42      
Winter_Off-peak_0.75 44.91      45.16      45.62      45.62      46.04      46.23      50.63      51.56      51.14      53.19      52.89      58.38      55.36      55.66      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.05 56.00      55.92      55.77      55.77      55.45      55.45      55.36      55.36      54.83      55.36      55.36      62.86      59.41      59.59      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.3 54.65      54.69      54.77      54.77      54.72      54.80      55.35      55.36      54.80      55.36      55.36      62.72      59.23      59.45      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.75 46.67      46.93      47.39      47.39      47.80      48.02      53.38      54.33      53.84      55.36      55.36      62.06      58.60      58.88      
Winter_On-peak_0.05 65.56      65.45      65.24      65.24      64.79      64.77      64.50      63.87      55.36      64.61      64.66      77.89      70.00      70.25      
Winter_On-peak_0.3 61.48      61.51      61.55      61.55      61.42      61.48      61.78      61.70      55.36      62.77      55.36      77.89      68.48      68.58      
Winter_On-peak_0.75 52.82      53.06      53.51      53.51      53.86      54.05      55.36      55.67      55.36      56.82      55.36      77.89      61.99      62.10      
Summer_Off-peak_0.05 52.62      52.57      52.48      52.48      52.26      52.30      52.61      52.62      52.12      53.65      53.56      57.74      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.3 49.59      49.65      49.77      49.77      49.81      49.92      50.79      51.25      50.83      52.69      52.58      57.44      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.75 44.87      45.12      45.59      45.59      46.04      46.17      47.51      48.27      47.96      50.10      49.96      55.36      53.44      53.45      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.05 55.93      55.86      55.71      55.71      55.40      55.40      55.36      55.36      54.79      55.36      55.36      62.51      59.13      59.33      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.3 54.44      54.48      54.56      54.56      54.52      54.61      55.19      55.31      54.72      55.36      55.36      62.36      58.95      59.19      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.75 44.90      45.16      45.63      45.63      46.04      46.25      53.22      54.18      53.71      55.36      55.36      61.71      58.34      58.63      
Summer_On-peak_0.05 56.67      56.59      56.42      56.42      56.07      56.07      55.36      55.36      55.29      56.00      55.36      64.12      60.50      60.64      
Summer_On-peak_0.3 54.78      54.82      54.88      54.88      54.81      54.89      55.36      55.36      54.93      55.36      55.36      63.55      59.91      60.09      
Summer_On-peak_0.75 50.89      51.14      51.60      51.60      52.01      52.22      53.77      54.66      54.14      55.36      55.36      62.78      59.15      59.40      
Winter_Annual peak_0.05 87.04      87.00      86.82      86.82      86.48      86.52      86.35      85.75      55.36      86.68      86.62      103.80    93.09      93.67      
Winter_Annual peak_0.3 79.95      79.97      80.00      80.00      79.78      79.84      80.12      79.87      55.36      81.05      55.36      103.80    87.25      87.78      
Winter_Annual peak_0.75 62.79      63.04      63.52      63.52      63.85      64.04      65.32      65.95      55.36      67.55      55.36      103.80    73.09      73.47      
Winter_Off-peak 51.04      51.15      51.32      51.32      51.41      51.52      53.36      53.78      53.27      54.63      54.53      60.36      57.25      57.53      
Winter_Mid-peak 52.20      52.29      52.46      52.46      52.52      52.63      54.69      55.01      54.48      55.36      55.36      62.52      59.05      59.28      
Winter_On-peak 59.26      59.34      59.48      59.48      59.45      59.54      60.08      60.04      55.36      61.08      56.94      77.89      66.56      66.68      
Summer_Off-peak 49.95      50.00      50.09      50.09      50.10      50.20      50.95      51.29      50.86      52.65      52.54      57.25      55.09      55.09      
Summer_Mid-peak 53.60      53.64      53.69      53.69      53.63      53.70      54.97      55.17      54.60      55.36      55.36      62.32      58.93      59.16      
Summer_On-peak 54.87      54.90      54.94      54.94      54.84      54.91      55.13      55.26      54.94      55.57      55.36      63.63      60.00      60.18      
Winter_Annual peak 75.38      75.47      75.62      75.62      75.56      75.66      76.20      76.18      55.36      77.46      60.67      103.80    83.48      83.97      
Time-weighted average 54.48 54.53 54.64 54.64 54.61 54.70 55.53 55.70 54.04 56.43 55.18 65.74 60.43 60.59
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Table 30 Prices across all scenarios under UNI in 2015 (elasticity =-0.25) 
Central elasticity
-0.25
NW-
SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
Scenarios N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Winter_Off-peak_0.05 57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      
Winter_Off-peak_0.3 56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      56.63      
Winter_Off-peak_0.75 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.05 57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      57.82      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.3 57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      57.51      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.75 56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      56.06      
Winter_On-peak_0.05 82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      
Winter_On-peak_0.3 82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      
Winter_On-peak_0.75 82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      
Summer_Off-peak_0.05 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.3 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.75 49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      49.13      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.05 57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      57.68      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.3 57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      57.27      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.75 55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      55.81      
Summer_On-peak_0.05 58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      58.13      
Summer_On-peak_0.3 57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      
Summer_On-peak_0.75 56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      56.48      
Winter_Annual peak_0.05 134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    
Winter_Annual peak_0.3 134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    
Winter_Annual peak_0.75 134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    
Winter_Off-peak 56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      56.30      
Winter_Mid-peak 57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      57.08      
Winter_On-peak 82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      82.78      
Summer_Off-peak 54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      54.48      
Summer_Mid-peak 57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      57.21      
Summer_On-peak 57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      57.81      
Winter_Annual peak 134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    134.61    
Time-weighted average 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73 63.73
Prices (£/MWh, 2008 money)
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Table 31 Prices across all scenarios under UNI in 2015 (elasticity =-0.50) 
Central elasticity
-0.50
NW-
SHETL N-SHETL SLOY S-SHETL N-SPTL S-SPTL UN-E&W NW-E&W NE-E&W N-E&W MW-E&W ME-E&W M-E&W SW-E&W SE-E&W S-E&W
Scenarios N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
Winter_Off-peak_0.05 57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      57.52      
Winter_Off-peak_0.3 57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      57.05      
Winter_Off-peak_0.75 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.05 58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      58.12      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.3 57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      57.97      
Winter_Mid-peak_0.75 56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      56.51      
Winter_On-peak_0.05 77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      
Winter_On-peak_0.3 77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      
Winter_On-peak_0.75 77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      
Summer_Off-peak_0.05 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.3 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Off-peak_0.75 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.05 57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      57.96      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.3 57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      57.72      
Summer_Mid-peak_0.75 56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      56.31      
Summer_On-peak_0.05 58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      58.91      
Summer_On-peak_0.3 58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      58.45      
Summer_On-peak_0.75 56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      56.90      
Winter_Annual peak_0.05 103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    
Winter_Annual peak_0.3 103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    
Winter_Annual peak_0.75 103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    
Winter_Off-peak 56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      56.56      
Winter_Mid-peak 57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      57.50      
Winter_On-peak 77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      77.89      
Summer_Off-peak 55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      55.36      
Summer_Mid-peak 57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      57.61      
Summer_On-peak 58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      58.39      
Winter_Annual peak 103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    103.80    
Time-weighted average 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68 62.68
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Table 32 Maximum and minimum prices across all scenarios in 2015 
Maximum price Minimum price
Central elasticity
-0.25 134.61 49.13
High elasticity
-0.50 103.80 55.36
Maximum price Minimum price
Central elasticity
-0.25 134.61 43.22
High elasticity
-0.50 103.80 44.87
Prices in £/MWh (2008 
money)
Prices in £/MWh (2008 
money)
LMP
UNI
 
4.2. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND POLICY INSIGHTS 
4.2.1. Further analysis of modelling results 
Section 4.1 has presented several types of results which were produced by the 
model. Therefore it appears sensible to try and summarize the key messages that 
flow from those results. 
With regards to energy results, Table 17 has shown that under LMP demand is 
over 2% higher than under UNI (for both elasticity cases). Also because of the 
energy balance constraints both total production and transmission losses are higher 
too. Wind output is the same in magnitude under both pricing mechanisms, which 
means it is marginally smaller in percentage terms with nodal pricing. However such 
negative effect is more than offset by the fact that production from other renewable 
technologies is 85% higher under LMP. 
Annual transmission losses are greater in magnitude under optimal pricing 
(Table 19). Nevertheless they are smaller as a percentage of production! Indeed, the 
results indicate that with a higher elasticity total losses under LMP are smaller in 
both absolute and relative quantities. This outcome should not be surprising since 
nodal pricing efficiently allocates the cost of marginal losses, as shown in equation  
(3.25). This also implies that with the actual level of transmission losses (around 2% 
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of peak demand) the difference in efficiency between LMP and UNI would be even 
higher. 
By the same principle, Table 19 has also indicated that a more responsive 
demand is necessary in order to “rip the benefits” of LMP’s efficiency and thus 
reduce the number of hours when the system is congested. Finally the sensitivity 
analysis in Table 20 has shown that under LMP congestion always occurs on lines 6, 
9, 12 and 14. The locational signals arising from such consistency and from spatially 
differentiated prices, suggest that LMP is more efficient at indicating where 
transmission investments may be required.    
With regards to economic results, one of the key messages has been that with 
nodal pricing the British electricity market may achieve a greater social welfare than 
with uniform pricing. In particular Table 23 has indicated that under LMP consumers 
as a whole are better off as their total surplus is 4% higher in the central case. At the 
same time, in spite of a higher demand (=> higher sales), producers are much worse 
off as their profit falls by 31% in the central case. This result is mostly due to the fact 
that average nodal prices are lower than the uniform ones.  
The other key message, for its bearing on the research question, is that, thanks 
to their SRMC equal to zero, wind farms manage to do better than most fossil-fuelled 
generators, although their profit – without considering the income from selling ROCs 
– still falls by almost 19% under LMP (Table 24). 
Also, sensitivity analysis in Table 21 has suggested that, as would be 
anticipated, the more transmission capacity is constrained with respect to generation 
the more LMP would outperform UNI in terms of social welfare. 
As far as price results are concerned, Table 27 has shown that under LMP gen-
erators in Scotland receive an average market price which is over 16% lower than 
under UNI. On average, with spatial pricing, generators at all nodes would be paid a 
lower energy price, with the only key exception of the London area (node 14) where 
the nodal price is 5% higher. This is because load requirements at node 14, which 
vary between 5 and 12GW depending on the scenario, can never be met by local 
generation, which has less than 2GW of capacity. Moreover Figure 34 has indicated 
that LMP average prices at the three southernmost nodes are much higher than at the 
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rest of the nodes26. The latter result may suggest the need for investments in either 
transmission and/or generation capacity at those three nodes. Indeed, even though 
this model is based on short-run marginal costs only, it is believed that a system 
based on LMP would improve the investments signals sent to generators and network 
companies, as suggested in Green (2007). Indeed Figure 35 signals where generators 
might receive a higher price under LMP, and thus where, in the long term, it might 
be more convenient to build new power plants (e.g. node 14). Similarly the price dif-
ferentials in the same figure indicate to a system operator where the grid would need 
reinforcements in order to reduce congestion (e.g. line 12). In reality, as argued in 
Turvey (2006), these long-term signals may be distorted by other regulatory tools 
(e.g. green certificates, discounted network charges) which may lead developers to 
build generation capacity at less efficient locations (e.g. on-shore wind farms in Scot-
land).       
Finally it must be pointed that the sensitivity analysis has demonstrated the 
modelling results to be sufficiently robust. That is, all results from the base case 
elasticity are consistent with those from the higher case. Moreover, the analysis 
suggests that a more responsive demand seems to boost some of LMP’s efficiencies 
over UNI: e.g. with regards to consumer surplus under LMP, the latter is 4% and 6% 
higher than under UNI in the base and high case respectively. 
4.2.2. Policy insights and recommendations 
Since the development of the model has been continuously driven by the need 
to answer the original research questions, it is useful to revisit the latter: 
• Research questions.  
 Can the objectives of a locationally efficient network policy and those 
of a renewable policy be achieved simultaneously? And what are the 
trade-offs of achieving both policies simultaneously? 
• Research Sub-questions.  
 Given the adoption of optimal spatial pricing, how does this affect the 
level of production from renewable energy (wind in particular)? 
                                                 
26
 This is particularly good news for 1.1GW of off-shore wind farms located at node 15 (“Round two 
sites). 
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 What happens to the social welfare of an electricity system, which has 
adopted optimal spatial pricing, when there is an environmental target 
(e.g. renewable penetration or carbon emissions) to be met? 
 How can we develop a more sophisticated approach to renewable 
policy which takes into account these trade-offs? 
One of the key results arising from the model is that annual profit for wind 
generation is much worse under LMP than under UNI, especially due to lower 
average prices in the north. Considering that wind technology is likely to provide the 
largest contribution towards a future renewable target (e.g. EU 2020), that result may 
suggest that, at least in the UK, a locationally efficient network policy and a 
renewable policy are not compatible without further policy interventions. Indeed, this 
is one of the reasons why generators in Scotland have historically resisted the 
introduction of locational charges (Di Castelnuovo, Leach, & Pearson, 2008). 
However, lower profits are not the only relevant issue: as successive energy 
White Papers have made clear, UK energy policy has multiple objectives. From a 
broad policy perspective it is inappropriate to argue that a renewable policy should 
be developed without coordination with a locationally efficient network policy, 
whatever the electricity system under consideration. In fact, even outside the UK, 
several system operators (e.g. California) have suggested that transmission 
limitations are the “fundamental obstacle” to achieve the state’s environmental 
objectives (NERC, 2008).  
First of all, the results show that wind output is the same under both pricing 
mechanisms but production from other renewable technologies such as biomass and 
hydro is much greater under LMP. Therefore any policymaker should consider that, 
for instance a location with worse wind resources but lower network externalities 
may lead to a higher social welfare than one with better wind speed, such as some 
locations in the North.  
Also, it must be pointed out that, even though under LMP each wind farm 
would receive the “correct” value of its electricity at each moment and location, the 
market would still be inefficient. That is because, in spite of having zero CO2 emis-
sions, wind can be rewarded for this positive externality only if fossil-fuelled genera-
tion pays the correct price for CO2. However, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme has 
often failed to deliver appropriate prices for the social cost of  carbon (Committee on 
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Climate Change, 2009). Such market failure, which is not specific to wind but which 
is certainly very relevant for all low-carbon generators, could be addressed by offer-
ing a feed-in tariff or a premium payment on top of the nodal price. Further discus-
sion on such proposal goes beyond the scope of this study but may be found, for ex-
ample, in Grubb, Jamasb and Pollitt (2008). 
With regards to the difference in social welfare between the two pricing 
systems, it may be argued that a saving of “only” 0.2% a year under LMP may be too 
small to justify a radical change in energy policy. However, introducing optimal 
pricing may involve a much larger welfare transfer among market participants. For 
instance, Table 22 has shown that in the high elasticity case there would be a 
“transfer” of over £800 million from producers to consumers in the form of a higher 
consumer surplus. Also, although northern generators and southern consumers would 
lose out under LMP, northern consumers and southern generators are better off 
(although with different percentages). Moreover instead of subsidizing (under UNI) 
higher network externalities caused by on-shore wind, savings under LMP might be 
better spent for less mature low-carbon technologies like CCS, or solar. Clearly, 
however, any policy that brings with it such a large redistribution of welfare would 
be hard to introduce from a political point of view. 
The model has also shown that even though wind farms, due to their zero 
SRMC, can often displace fossil-fuelled generation, the cost of doing so will vary by 
location. But only a competitive locational marginal pricing (e.g. as in PJM) can 
efficiently reflect the spatial differentiation in the value of electricity (Green, 2008). 
Instead the current British transmission access regime (TAR), combined with 
uniform pricing, offers firm capacity up to declared net capacity of the generator but 
only when that transmission capacity is available or has been built. In exchange the 
generator pays an annual charge (i.e. TNUoS charge), but effectively zero variable 
cost (e.g. losses), undermining efficient scale, timing and operating decisions for 
wind farms (Newbery (2009).  
If LMP is considered to be more efficient, as the modelling results suggest, 
then this raises the question of why it has not been adopted in the GB system (as well 
as in other markets). LMP is considered by economists as an economically efficient 
means for the allocation of costs and yet most systems choose to go for a less classi-
Optimal spatial pricing for electricity and its impact on renewable generation technologies and 
their operations  
 125 
cally efficient solution. The results from the model suggest that for the UK one of the 
main reasons for this is the disparity in charging between geographic regions where 
there may be already socio-economic divides. Furthermore market externalities, such 
as an inefficiently low carbon price, can further distort the disparity in charges, as 
can a lack of comprehensive application of the pricing system (e.g. between genera-
tion and demand).  
Di Castelnuovo (2004b) carried out an industry consultation on these issues. 
Most respondents, with the key exception of the British Wind Energy Association, 
seemed to believe that renewables are not a special case and thus should be facing 
locational signals on a level playing field, without cross-subsidies. Most importantly, 
regarding LMP, nobody considered this approach as a realistic possibility for the 
UK, at least not in the short-term, particularly for fear that an LMP system would 
lead to excessive transaction costs (caused by marginal losses charging) and price 
volatility (caused by congestion charging). Interesting these are the same arguments 
which had been used by some market participants against the introduction of zonal 
charging for losses (Ofgem, 2007b).  
It is fair to say that since that consultation, the policy debate on the relationship 
between renewable policy and transmission policy has certainly made a lot of 
progress.  Under the existing rules, known as “invest then connect”, thermal 
generators have effectively been given preference over new renewable generators 
even though they have not made any contractual commitment to pay for network 
access; these generators have also the option to stop paying any charges at one year’s 
notice. This places renewables at the back of the queue to connect to and use the 
network. Thus, for example, according to NGC, in 2008 there were over 17GW of 
renewable generation in the queue for connection to the transmission system, as 
shown in Figure 37 (Ofgem, 2008). The UK government is currently consulting on 
proposals to improve these access rules, including a move to a “connect and manage” 
approach, whereby generation could be connected ahead of transmission investment 
(Frontier Economics, 2009).  
Similarly there is growing concern about the increasing level of constraint 
costs associated with managing transmission capacity shortages: in 2008/09 they 
were £262m compared to £70m for 2007/08. Currently these costs are recovered 
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equally from generators and suppliers across Great Britain via Balancing Services 
Use of System charges (BSUoS) on a non-locational basis (£/MWh). In order to ad-
dress this problem, the regulator is currently consulting on introducing locational 
BSUoS (Ofgem, 2009a). These proposed network charges, which are charged ex-
post, may not be as efficient as nodal prices, which are charged ex-ante, but they cer-
tainly look a step in the right direction because they will provide some locational 
price signals.  
Another issue with implementing LMP is that, in spite of its tendency to 
promote greater efficiency, its locational signals may not be entirely correct. Indeed, 
transmission investments are lumpy in nature and LMP reflects SRMC, not the long-
run marginal costs (LRMC) necessary to signal where to locate new capacity (Hsu, 
1997). As suggested by Brunekreeft, Neuhoff & Newbery (2005), such a shortfall in 
costs could be recovered by offering a transmission constraint contract (= a contract 
for differences based on nodal price) and levying a locational network tariff (e.g. 
deep connection charge). It was not feasible to explore this kind of detail policy 
measure in the modelling reported here. 
Figure 37 Connection opportunities in 2009 (NGC, 2009a) 
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Overall the model results reported here suggest that an appropriately sophisti-
cated renewable policy should try to take into account the following trade-offs and 
synergies with a locationally efficient network policy: 
• More efficient spatial pricing generally penalizes those generators which are 
located farther from demand centres, such as renewable generators sited in re-
mote areas (trade-off). 
• More efficient spatial pricing may lead to a reduction (at least in percentage) 
in network losses, thus in carbon emissions (synergy).  
• Implementing a more efficient transmission policy may help identify which 
mix of low-carbon technologies and locations is more cost-effective and thus 
which one should be subsidized: e.g. an on-shore windmill in the North of 
Scotland vs. a biomass plant in the South East of England (synergy). 
• ETSO (2007) argued that the grid was not designed for transport from remote 
areas with high concentration of wind power, which leads to congestions in 
some locations. Even though this is often due to transmission investments 
lagging behind new generation coming onto the system, more adequate 
locational signals may reduce congestion costs but also possibly penalize 
renewables while the deployment of more wind farms may increase 
congestion costs (trade-off). 
• Both transmission policy and renewable policies may contribute to energy 
security: e.g. investing in more renewable energy plants leads to a reduction 
of the gas share in the electricity mix; on the other hand transmission lines 
can act as a substitute for generation, including gas-fired generation 
(synergy). 
Finally, it should be remembered that the scope of any conclusion which may 
be drawn from the results is limited by the model’s own assumptions (e.g. a limited 
number of wind conditions, perfect competition). Even taking this constraint into 
account however, the model results suggest that an efficient network policy and a 
renewable policy may be achieved simultaneously in a power system based on 
optimal spatial pricing.  
The first part of this section has presented a summary and a detailed analysis of 
all results produced by the model. These results are intended to represent two 
different scenarios for the British electricity market in 2015, based on two different 
forms of network pricing. In each of the two scenarios a sensitivity analysis for two 
values of demand elasticity has been carried out. The analysis of results has been 
divided in three sections: energy, welfare and prices. 
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The second part of this section has introduced and analyzed some of the key 
policy insights which seem to flow from the model’s results. In particular it has been 
suggested that implementing a more efficient transmission policy may help identify 
which mix of low-carbon technologies and locations is more cost-effective and thus 
which might be appropriate for further policy intervention, such as subsidies. The 
following and final chapter will review the achievement of the objectives of the the-
sis, assess the strengths and limitations of the research and make some recommenda-
tion for further research. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
This last section is structured as follows: part one ( 5.1) revisits what has been 
set out in the first chapter and highlights the key findings of the PhD; part two ( 5.2) 
reviews the strengths of the thesis; part three ( 5.3) outlines its limitations; the last 
part ( 5.4) suggest key areas of further research. 
5.1. THESIS REVIEW  
Before drawing any final conclusion it is appropriate to recall from Chapter 1 
the research questions that the thesis set out to answer: 
• Research questions.  
 Can the objectives of a locationally efficient network policy and those 
of a renewable policy be achieved simultaneously? And what are the 
trade-offs of achieving both policies simultaneously? 
• Research Sub-questions.  
 Given the adoption of optimal spatial pricing, how does this affect the 
level of production from renewable energy (wind in particular)? 
 What happens to the social welfare of an electricity system, which has 
adopted optimal spatial pricing, when there is an environmental target 
(e.g. renewable penetration or carbon emissions) to be met? 
 How can we develop a more sophisticated approach to renewable 
policy which takes into account these trade-offs? 
In order address the research questions, a series of specific objectives were set 
out in Chapter 1. Viewed in terms of these objectives, the main achievements and 
contributions of this research in the area of optimal spatial pricing for electricity and 
its impact on renewable energy are summarised in the following sections: 
• OBJECTIVE 1: Understand through a literature review how spatial pricing 
works in all its different forms: e.g. nodal prices, zonal transmission tariffs, 
etc.  
This objective has been achieved mostly in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
The first paragraph outlined the main differences between various forms of locational 
signals (e.g. short-term vs. long-term signals), including a brief description of net-
work policy in the GB market. This was followed by a critical review of the literature 
in the area of network policy. In particular this section was important for identifying 
and scrutinising those contributions to the literature that would have significant in-
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fluence on the development of the model (e.g. Green, 2007). After an overview of 
renewable policy literature, the last part of the review identified those publications 
that addressed both network and renewable policy.    
• OBJECTIVE 2: Identify the short-term spatial costs caused by the 
deployment of an increasing amount of renewable technologies. 
This has been achieved, with a focus on the deployment of wind technology, as 
this is the most relevant (by capacity) renewable resource for the GB system. In 
particular, as Chapter 4 demonstrated, the model has been run under different wind 
conditions, which allows analysis of the impact of variation in capacity to be 
undertaken. The analysis of the results has suggested, for instance, that transmission 
losses tend to increase proportionally with the wind capacity. The same may be said 
about congestion costs and wind installed capacity, although the relationship appears 
less linear.  
• OBJECTIVE 3: Develop representative scenarios to depict the GB power 
system in 2015. 
The emphasis on the scenario building was to generate a thoroughly researched 
set of scenarios that would allow testing of the economic theory in a representative 
environment. These scenarios were built in two stages (in Chapter 3). First inputs on 
network, demand, generation, wind and costs were modelled separately. Then all 
these modelling blocks were reconciled, to assure consistencies (e.g. mapping 
generation and demand scenarios to a 16-node network). Seven demand scenarios 
were designed as input for the model, each to be run under three different wind 
conditions. These 21 scenarios were intended to provide a reasonable representation 
of the possible GB power system in 2015. Each scenario was run in the model under 
two pricing mechanisms (LMP and UNI). Also a sensitivity analysis was carried out 
for two values of demand elasticity. Overall the model has run 84 different cases.    
• OBJECTIVE 4: Build an economic model for assessing the effects upon 
generators (especially renewables) of adopting different locational signals. 
Two optimization models for welfare maximization were built. The process is 
outlined in Chapter 3. One model is based on a market with nodal pricing while the 
other is based on uniform pricing. Both models have the same sets of inputs and pa-
rameters, to allow comparison of the effect of different pricing methodologies for the 
same GB system.  
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• OBJECTIVE 5: Use the model to investigate the difference between loca-
tional marginal pricing and less economically efficient pricing approaches 
(e.g. uniform pricing) in terms of welfare, prices and energy results (e.g. total 
demand). 
This has been achieved with the analysis of the model results in Chapter 4. 
Two forms of spatial pricing were investigated and compared, i.e. nodal and uniform. 
• OBJECTIVE 6: Study both supply and demand behaviour under different 
pricing approaches. 
Demand for electricity was extensively investigated in the second part 
of Chapter 3. This was necessary in order to build a robust set of demand 
inputs for the model. Their behaviour of consumer and producers was 
analysed in Chapter 4. 
• OBJECTIVE 7: Understand how optimal spatial pricing might help achieve 
an economically efficient electricity system, given the constraints set by 
environmental policies. 
This was explored in the model (with both pricing mechanisms) in 
several ways. First of all, the model used NGC’s Gone Green scenario for 
meeting the 2020 EU target; secondly, SRMC included a cost of carbon 
permits; thirdly, wind was the generation technology in the model with “zero” 
SRMC, to make sure that as much wind energy as possible would be 
dispatched. 
• OBJECTIVE 8: Provide useful information to the decision-making process in 
the area of market architecture, including spatial pricing methodologies. 
This final objective was addressed in Chapter 4, with a quantitative analysis of 
the results followed by a qualitative discussion of the results. 
The model produced a series of annual estimates in terms of energy, welfare 
and prices for a GB power system in 2015 under two spatial pricing approaches: an 
optimal one (LMP) and the current – and as the model showed - less efficient one 
(UNI). 
With regards to energy results, this comparative study indicates that, according 
to the model and its parameters, annual consumption is over 2% higher under LMP 
than under UNI. Production from wind farms is the same in magnitude with both 
pricing systems, which means that it is actually lower in relative terms under LMP. 
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However production from other renewable technologies is actually 85% higher with 
nodal pricing.  Regarding network externalities, LMP produces fewer losses (as a 
percentage of demand) than UNI.  
In terms of social welfare, its annual value is 0.2% higher under LMP in the 
base case. Consumer surplus is 4% higher with nodal pricing while generators’ profit 
is nearly on third (31%) lower. This suggests that under LMP there is redistribution 
of welfare (over £800 million in the high elasticity case) from producers to 
consumers. Such an outcome highlights the potential political sensitivity of changing 
the network policy towards efficient locational pricing. Indeed the annual average 
price is 9% lower under LMP. Moreover the analysis has shown that under LMP 
generators in Scotland receive an average market price which is over 16% lower than 
under UNI. On average, with spatial pricing, generators at all nodes would be paid a 
lower energy price, with the only key exception being the London area (node 14) 
where the nodal price is 5% higher.  
Looking back at the research question, the model results may seem to indicate 
that locationally efficient network policy and those of a renewable policy may be 
hard to achieve simultaneously. For example, annual profits for wind farms are 19% 
lower, due to lower average prices under LMP. However, this does not mean that a 
more sophisticated renewable policy and a more detailed model could not aim to 
address such trade-offs.  First of all a higher carbon price would penalize 
conventional fossil fuel generators and improve wind energy profitability. Also, it 
should be remembered that the analysis has not taken into account the income that 
wind farms would receive from selling ROCs.  
Moreover Figure 34 indicated that LMP average prices at the three southern-
most nodes are much higher than at the rest of the nodes. This is particularly good 
news for 1.1GW of off-shore wind farms located at node 15 (“Round two sites). But 
it also implies that it is mostly northern wind farms which would be missing out un-
der an LMP system. Because of the large quantities of wind farm located in the north 
(as shown in Figure 38), once again this issue highlights the highly political sensitiv-
ity of moving to a more efficient form of spatial pricing. Indeed the Scottish Gov-
ernment recently made clear its view that the current locational transmission charges 
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present a bias in the UK transmission regulatory system against remote generation  
(The Scottish Government, 2009). 
Finally it is believed that the issues raised by the research question are likely to 
grow in importance and complexity in the coming years. Indeed, as Figure 39 
indicates, the imbalance between generation in the north and load requirements in the 
south, is bound to become larger, especially because of the increasing amount of on-
shore wind farms applying for connection to the grid. Therefore it seems that a 
renewable policy that tries to reconcile the objectives of a more efficient network 
policy may be in a better position to achieve its own objectives, like 35% of 
renewable energy by 2020.  
 
Figure 38 Wind farm capacities currently installed in the UK (DECC, 2009a) 
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Figure 39 Power flows in the GB system for 2009/10 and 2015/16 (NGC, 2009a) 
 
5.2. THESIS STRENGHTS 
Ratification of increasingly stringent environmental targets is likely to increase 
the share of renewables in the energy mix over a relatively short period of time (e.g. 
in Great Britain, 35% of renewable by 2020 from 6% in 2008). The requirement for 
such a steep rise in the deployment of renewables is posing unprecedented challenges 
to the network which has to accommodate them. Efficient network planning, 
investment and deployment all become complex in the face of uncertainty around the 
location and levels of renewable investment. Even though the literatures on both 
network planning and pricing policy and on renewable policy are well established, 
there seem to be relatively few publications addressing both policies simultaneously. 
By trying to address the research question, it is hoped that this thesis has contributed 
towards filling this gap in the literature. 
The central pillar of the thesis is represented by the optimization model, which 
was developed from scratch. As indicated in Ventosa et al.(2005), there is a vast lit-
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erature on electricity models, but the focus of most (particularly those that focus on 
the microeconomics of the social welfare optimisation problem) tends to be on sim-
plified (non-representative) system models. These are models that do not reflect the 
spatial aspects that are so fundamental to network planning and pricing and to the 
effective operation and management of the network. 
The development and implementation of a spatial model of this kind proved 
both resource- and time-intensive. Thus, for example, approximately six months 
were spent to develop scenarios with in-depth and comprehensive research that drew 
on a wide range of inputs, to try and generate representative inputs within the 
limitations of any modelling exercise. The development of the demand scenarios 
alone required six weeks of research and analysis. 
Several characteristic contribute to differentiate this model from other models 
addressing similar issues, such as e.g. Stigler & Todem, (2005). 
 First of all, a DCLF radial rather than a meshed network (used in Green 
(2007)) was adopted to represent the GB transmission system. This particular 
approach was chosen, after some deliberation,  because it had been developed 
specifically for investigating optimal transmission requirements and access 
arrangements on the GB network (Pöyry Energy Consulting, 2008b). This aspect 
made it a fitting choice for this PhD research. Furthermore, the radial approach 
makes it more straightforward to calculate flows and losses. The final results in terms 
of signalling where constraint might occur proved consistent with NGC’s official 
data, suggesting a robust modelling approach. 
In comparison with Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen, (2008), the model 
looks at a one year interval rather than only one hour. This implies that demand 
scenarios are much more detailed in this PhD. On the other hand Green (2007) 
investigates nodal pricing but only for England & Wales and for 1996, while this 
model looks at the whole GB market and for 2015. Furthermore, Green’s study has 
only two types of generation technologies, must-run and variable, and adopts a linear 
marginal cost function. This model instead adopts a more realistic step-wise cost 
function for ten generation technologies, including wind.  
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Strbac et al. (2007) models more detailed wind conditions but does not include 
a demand function to estimate consumer behaviour. Instead, the model developed in 
this thesis uses a linear demand function and calculates social welfare rather than just 
the cost of dispatch. 
Finally the model results seem not only consistent among themselves but also 
broadly consistent with those of similar studies. This suggests that the model is 
sufficiently robust to produce results which contribute to answering the research 
question effectively.  
The next ten years will see the fast deployment of large quantities of renewable 
generation, wind in particular, but the nature of how and where this will occur is 
highly uncertain (Ofgem, 2008). The UK Government appears committed to help 
deliver all renewable technologies in a market environment (DECC, 2009b). This 
implies that generators, supplier and regulated networks should be working to this 
end. The modelling described in the thesis goes some way towards supporting the 
view that LMP helps to provide a marketplace with more accurate information on 
network costs, as well as potentially more certainty, which helps to deliver a more 
efficient solution (Harvey, McConihe, & Pope, 2006). Nevertheless, in spite of its 
known efficiency LMP has not been adopted in the GB system. Therefore, it is the 
contention of this thesis that investigating and modelling the combination of a large 
deployment of renewables with a more efficient form of locational signals makes a 
timely contribution to the debate about the future of the GB system. 
5.3. THESIS LIMITATIONS 
Like any research project, this PhD is characterized by some limitations, some 
of which are generic and some specific to this particular piece of research. First of 
all, a modelling exercise of this kind is a representation of reality that must abstract 
from the full complexity of the underlying detail – and that offers insights into 
(rather than a prediction of) events and trade-offs that might occur. As an illustration 
of the simplifying assumptions that are common in such models, the assumption of 
perfectly competitive markets is usually less than realistic, even though it is 
commonly adopted in microeconomic analysis.  
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Also, welfare valuations are subject to some reservations, especially because of 
the assumptions that tend to be made about the demand function, as confirmed by the 
controversy surrounding the effective value of cost benefit analysis (Boardman et al., 
2006). While some of the values for the supply side are relatively easy to infer (e.g. 
fuel costs), willingness-to-pay or reserve prices for demand are much more difficult 
to estimate with precision. 
Moreover any deterministic model simplifies many of the true operational 
costs, e.g. in this case, reserves, start-up and partial load costs. However, as noted, 
the purpose of this type of modelling is not to accurately forecast future nodal prices 
but to analyse the differentials between results and the implications that they have for 
the likely demand and supply behaviours, and the implications for investors and 
policy makers (e.g. lower average prices make consumers better off under LMP). 
Although the wind modelling approach adopted here is an improvement on 
previous models, due to computational and time constraints, it was not possible to 
include the full impact of wind intermittency on system operation and system costs. 
Also, by the same token, it was not possible to fully show how demand could interact 
and help to balance wind from a system operation perspective. This is a typical trade-
off of system modelling vs. economic modelling. Indeed the model’s approach 
allowed the inclusion of demand elasticities, which are essential for more effective 
modelling of social welfare values. 
Finally there is an issue of consistency in the model’s approach towards con-
gestion management under UNI. As explained in section in section 3.2.6, the UNI 
approach conceived for this model is “cleverer”, i.e. more efficient, in managing 
congestion than NGC would be in reality. Therefore it is possible that with the cur-
rent pricing arrangements, wind farms in the North might be constrained-off at cer-
tain times due to congestion on the Cheviot boundary (equivalent to line 6 in the 
model). This implies that total wind output might be lower than under LMP. Simi-
larly, because conventional generation would have to replace constrained-on output 
from wind, total dispatch cost would be higher and social welfare lower than under 
LMP. 
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5.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research reported here suggests that there are several areas that would par-
ticularly warrant further work and analysis. They are outlined in brief below. 
• International comparison of locational pricing. If the analysis of the model’s 
output actually suggests that more efficient spatial pricing might lead to an 
increase in social welfare, then it might be appropriate to address the political 
economy of question why better locational signals have not been adopted 
among all restructured electricity systems. It is often said that LMP is not 
adopted for political reasons and lack of liquidity. But the answer could be 
more elaborate, for instance by comparing the general approach adopted in 
the US (e.g. the role of the Regional Transmission Operator) with that used in 
the European Union. While US electricity markets are gradually moving 
towards a common standard, of which nodal pricing represents one of the 
pillars, the European counterparts have produced a wide range of solutions to 
address the spatial dimension of electricity (Ehrenmann & Smeers, 2005; 
ETSO, 2008; Joskow, 2005). Is it possible that every European approach to 
spatial pricing is optimal? If not, which one might represent at least a second 
best in terms of economic efficiency? 
• Long term pricing and investment. As explained in paragraph 4.2.2, because 
of the nature of the cost functions LMP is not sufficient to recover capital 
costs. Moreover the model is based on short-run marginal costs for genera-
tion. Therefore the model could be adapted to investigate long-run marginal 
costs and investments in both transmission and generation. Such an exercise 
would be particularly interesting for investigating how decisions might be af-
fected by locational signals. 
• Wind generation profiling. As mentioned above, the representation of wind 
variability is one of the limitations of the model is. Therefore further research 
could include wind profiles which vary not only in time but also in space, i.e. 
different wind output at various nodes at a particular moment in time. Such a 
model could investigate whether welfare would be higher at nodes where 
wind speed and network costs are lower than those with better wind resources 
but higher network externalities (e.g. Scottish on-shore wind farms). 
• Econometric estimation of demand curves. Since the results suggest that most 
of the benefits from optimal spatial pricing come from the demand side, it 
would be reasonable to become more confident about the functional form of 
the demand curve. This could be achieved by collecting more observations 
first and then using appropriate econometric techniques in order to estimate 
the key parameters. 
• The role of carbon prices. A high price for carbon would reflect the 
environmental dimension in an LMP pricing model and could change the 
outcome for renewable generation. It would, by internalising the climate 
externality, increase prices overall – but it might also improve the profit 
margin for renewables in the north – despite their location. Further work 
could explore the sensitivity of the model to a range of carbon prices. 
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• Finally, even though this goes beyond the scope of the present study, further 
analysis of the model’s results might also be used to investigate the important 
issue of how renewables and locational signals might affect the level of 
energy security of a particular system. Large amounts of wind energy may 
displace gas-fired generation, which could increase energy security. But what 
if this happens at the expense of nuclear or coal-fired power stations? On the 
other hand implementing further locational signals might provide incentives 
to build more generating capacity near load centres, possibly in the form of 
more distributed generation; but it could also be the case that, in a situation 
like that of the GB system, a nodal pricing scheme could excessively penalize 
coal-fired power station in the North of the country, which would then reduce 
the level of energy security (e.g. coal can always be burned but wind doesn’t 
always blow). It appears that the effect upon energy security of the two 
objectives is rather difficult to assess prior to the construction and operation 
of an appropriate model.   
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Appendix 1 
This sections provides a numerical example for equation (3.17), 
( ) 11 1TFS R A A R A −− −= . In particular the numbers used in this example represent the 
actual values adopted in the optimization model. 
R = 15x15 diagonal matrix, which contains the impedance of line i on its 
diagonal (iith element) and zeros elsewhere; 
 
 
A= 15x15 non-singular modified network incidence matrix and shows which 
nodes are connected to which line and (AT is its transpose); 
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SF= 15x16 shift factor matrix, whose entries represent the power transfer dis-
tribution factors for each line; 
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Appendix 2 
This section provides a numerical example of the optimisation process de-
scribed in section 3.2.6. In particular this example refers to the model scenario with 
annual peak demand in 2015, wind output at 75% of its installed capacity 
(=“Winter_Annual peak_0.75”) and a demand elasticity of -0.25.   
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: 
*
,
,
0
max ( )
nd
n n n n kd g
n n k
p d dd tc−∑ ∑∑∫                (A2.1) 
Where 
n
p = price at node n = inverse demand function at node n 
=
*
1
ref
ref n n
n ref
n
p d
p
dε
 
+ − 
 
                 (A2.2) 
p = vector of nodal prices= 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
60.62 60.87 61.34 61.34 61.67 61.85 63.05 63.61 55.36 N/A 65.19 55.36 N/A 134.61 70.64 71.00
 
ref
n
p = reference demand price, assumed identical at each node n = £73/MWh 
ε = demand elasticity = -0.25 (central case) 
refd = vector of reference demand values by node = 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
566 540 0 660 1,143 3,061 3,285 7,733 6,123 0 8,115 756 0 12,336 7,969 10,151
 
*d = vector of optimal demand values by node 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
590 563 0 686 1,187 3,178 3,397 7,981 6,493 0 8,333 802 0 9,733 8,033 10,221
 
,n k
n k
tc∑∑ = total cost of production 
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, , ,n k n k n ktc mc g=  = total cost of production of generator k at node n              (A2.3) 
,n k kmc mc= = short-run marginal cost (SRMC) of generator k               (A2.4) 
mc  = vector of short-run marginal costs of different types of generators = 
 
CCGT 55
CHP 63
Other gas 94
Coal 46
Nuclear 2
Interconnector 70
Biomass 56
Wind 0
Hydro 80
Pumped storage 90
SRMC (£/MWh)
 
 
*
,n kg = optimal level of production of generator k at node n 
*g  = matrix of optimal levels of generation (in MW) by technology and by node =
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N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
CCGT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,733 2,576 3,578 0 4,735 3,000 0 815 3,236 3,099
CHP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 329 0 0 205 0 0 0 0 142
Other gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 133 0 0
Coal 0 0 0 0 1,958 0 0 1,660 9,088 0 4,215 0 0 0 2,720 0
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 1,831 966 1,925 0 0 0 960 0 1,009 865 0
Interconnector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,488 0
Biomass 0 0 0 0 41 41 90 0 0 0 315 0 0 0 0 0
Wind 1,504 1,298 0 0 0 2,374 0 1,202 225 0 224 799 0 0 847 0
Hydro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pumped storage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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ENERGY BALANCE CONSTRAINT: 
,n k n
n k n
g d l= +∑∑ ∑                   (A2.5) 
Where 
Tl z Rz= = total transmission losses                 (A2.6) 
R = impedance matrix (see Appendix 1) 
z = vector of power flows (MW) for each transmission line i =  
 
TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 TB9 TB10 TB11 TB12 TB13 TB14 TB15
913 1,649 0 962 1,774 2,842 1,208 -290 6,398 7,316 1,362 3,957 12,635 -7,777 2,122
 
 
MAXIMUM GENERATION CONSTRAINT: 
max
, ,n k n kg g≤                   (A2.7) 
max
,n kg  = maximum capacity for generator k at node n  
maxg  = matrix of maximum levels of generation (in MW) by technology and 
by node = 
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N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N15 N16
CCGT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,733 2,576 7,281 0 4,735 3,538 0 815 3,236 3,099
CHP 0 11 0 0 111 108 0 329 1,096 0 205 0 0 0 0 142
Other gas 10 1,448 0 0 0 0 0 32 165 0 157 0 0 133 0 275
Coal 0 0 0 0 1,958 0 0 1,660 9,088 0 4,215 0 0 0 2,720 0
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 1,831 966 1,925 0 0 0 960 0 1,009 865 0
Interconnector 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,488 0
Biomass 0 0 0 0 41 41 90 0 212 0 315 0 0 0 0 0
Wind 1,504 1,298 0 0 0 2,374 0 1,202 225 0 224 799 0 0 847 0
Hydro 325 0 140 192 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pumped storage 285 0 0 0 418 0 0 1,904 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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MAXIMUM POWER FLOW CONSTRAINT: 
max
i iz z≤                    (A2.8) 
Where 
iz  = power flow on line i 
max
iz  = maximum capacity for flows on transmission line i 
max
z  = vector of maximum capacities (MW) for each transmission line i = 
TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6 TB7 TB8 TB9 TB10 TB11 TB12 TB13 TB14 TB15
1,676 2,600 220 2,750 3,027 4,400 3,671 1,661 6,398 10,603 5,974 3,957 12,771 7,777 6,423
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